Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
water and land to Soerabaja, where thirteen of the original seventeen
planes had arrived by 2 5 January. For five days thereafter the squadron
remained a t Soerabaja, engaging in flights and other activities de-
signed to acquaint the pilots with the peculiar problems of local air
defense. T w o days before the Japanese opened the attack on Java the
17th had occupied its permanent base a t Blimbing. The field, some-
times known as Ngoro, had two 4,000-foot runways surfaced with
smooth sod. Taxiways, offering natural advantages for camouflage,
were cut into the surrounding jungle.6o
When the Japanese attacked Soerabaja on 3 February, no other
American pursuit planes were nearer than Darwin. The second pro-
visional pursuit squadron to be activated in Australia, the zoth, had
received orders on 24 January to move with eighteen P-40’s to Port
Moresby, a key point in defense of the approaches to northeastern
Australia. This order undoubtedly reflected the concern of Allied
officials over the Japanese occupation of Rabaul, which had been ef-
fected the preceding day and which gave a new urgency to the prob-
lem of providing for the security of sea and air routes joining Australia
to the United States. Within another three days, however, the fall of
Kendari had emphasized the immediate urgency of the need in Java,
and in accordance with representations f r o d General Brett the orders
were changed. The 20th would move up to Darwin and thence would
proceed to Java.61 But it was 4 February before thirteen of its pilots,
most of whom had reached Australia during January as personnel of
the 35th Pursuit Group, lifted their P-40’s from a field at Darwin and
under the escort of a B-24 headed for Timor. This leg of the flight,
difficult enough for the short-range P-40 even under the best of con-
ditions, on that day presented the additional hazard of tropical thunder-
storms. The planes got through to Koepang, however, and on the
following day twelve of them were able to proceed to Bali.6z
Fearing a Japanese attack on the field there, Captain Lane ordered
his planes into the air as soon as they had been refueled. When seven
of them had taken off, approximately twenty enemy planes were
spotted overhead; three other P-40’S then hastily took off; and all were
immediately engaged by the enemy. Lt. Gene L. Bound destroyed an
enemy plane, but his own was so badly shot up that he had to bail out.
Lts. William L. Turner and C.L. Reagan were forced into crash land-
ings, the former having previously shot down one of the enemy. Lt.
Larry D. Landry was killed early in the flight, and Lt. Paul B.
386

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.