The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
centrated in and around S~erabaja.~'As for the interception of enemy
planes, preparations again had fallen short. The Dutch pursuits were
obsolete, and half of them were destroyed or put out of action by the
close of another day. Only a handful of the American P-40's had
reached Java from Australia, the first having come in on 24 January.
Based at Blimbing below Djombang, the American pilots received a
warning twenty to twenty-five minutes in advance of the enemy's
approach to Soerabaja, but by the time their P-40'S had taken off and
climbed to 21,000 feet the damage had been done. Although two
Japanese planes were shot down a t the cost of one American plane,
the enemy had come, done his work, and departed with little injury to
himself.51
The Problem of Pursuit Reinforcement
Plans for the organization and deployment of American pursuit
forces in the Netherlands East Indies had engaged much of the time
and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash-
ington throughout January. Australian and Dutch forces were weak;
British units were committed in the western part of the ABDA area.
There were problems of reconciling the urgent claims of NEI oper-
ations with the no less urgent concern of Australian authorities for the
immediate defense of their own territorie~.~~As the crucial battle for
Java opened, the hope was to deploy a total of nine squadrons in the
ABDA area in addition to providing three other squadrons which
would operate under Australian control for a strengthening of the
defenses of northeastern Australia and of Port Moresby in New
Guinea."
Allied plans had contemplated deployment of pursuit units at Koe-
pang, Amboina, Kendari, Samarinda, Soerabaja, and Batavia, but those
were days when sraffs frequently completed a plan only to find that
the latest report of enemy action had already outdated it. They were
days, too, of only the earliest beginnings of the American effort in
Australia, where no well-established base was ready and organized for
the purpose of pushing through reinforcements for the battle line
but, instead, hastily assembled staffs and forces improvised an organi-
zation as they went. The emphasis in Washington naturally had been
placed on speed in getting out to the Southwest Pacific all assistance
that could be provided, and the need for speed often led to confusion.
Inventories and manifests for shipments made were a t times imper-
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