Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
four heavy bomber sorties were dispatched. But of these, four missions
involving a total of seventeen bombers were abortive because of un-
favorable weather, and twenty-nine sorties in six other efforts resulted
only in negative reports. O n the remaining five missions, claims were
entered for the sinking of two transports and two other vessels, but
bomber losses were high. On 2 2 January, one B-17 was destroyed
when it overshot the field at Palembang; two days later, three B-17's
were badly shot up by enemy aircraft; on 24 January, two €3- I 7's of an
eight-plane mission were lost in crash landings, and only three of the
eight returned safely to Malang. On 2 7 January, Maj. Stanley K. Rob-
inson, commander of the 7th Group, while leading his fifth mission
within a week was shot down and with his entire crew was killed
when thirty Japanese pursuits attacked the formation of four B-17's.~'
Among the missions flown were those of 2 8 and 29 January against
Kuala Lunipur and the Kuantan airfield in the Malay States by four
B-17's which staged out of Palembang. Though their absence of two
and a half days from Malang still further weakened the defense against
the enemy above Java, the planes apparently succeeded in scoring
numerous hits on runways and hangars at K ~ a n t a n . ~ ~
T h e enemy on 26 January had captured Kendari, and to that
point he promptly transferred the forces of the 2 1st Air Flotilla which
on 3 February opened the attack on Java 'itself by savage strikes at
Soerabaja, Madioen, and Malar~g.~'O n that day near Malang the
Japanese caught American bombers standing on the Singosari field
loaded for take-off, and while enemy bombs tore the runway, strafers
concentrated their fire on the planes. Four B- I 7's exploded or burned,
and a fifth was shot down ten miles south of Malang. At Soerabaja
another Japanese formation damaged Dutch naval installations;
destroyed three Catalinas on the water; and in shooting down a B-18,
killed in addition to its entire crew several sorely needed radar experts
and Major Straubel, who had recently succeeded to the command of
the 7th T h e damage at Madioen was less serious, but the out-
look for a defense of Java against similar and continuing attacks was
dismal indeed.
In the absence of radar equipment, the Dutch air warning service
depended upon ground observation stations connected by wire with
a control room at Soerabaja. It had been well organized, bu; of course
there could be no substitute for modern equipment. There was a great
shortage also of antiaircraft guns, which for the most part were con-
383

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.