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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A I R S E R V I C E I N W O R L D W A R I
flared up, and friction occurred with air officers who had been in
France for some time. There was as well mutual antipathy between
air and ground officers. The Air Service was loath to take advice from
men who resolutely refused to enter a plane; ground officers accused
the aviators of being temperamental, lacking in the “garden variety of
home-made discipline,” of substituting a “hodgepodge of independent
personalities for an ordered administration.” 2 5 Pershing spoke of
Foulois’ staff as comprising a “lot of good men running around in
circles.” 2 6 At any rate, they proved incapable of building an effective
organization; their failure, aggravated by production delays at home
and tardiness in French deliveries, threatened to wreck all projected
aviation schedules. It was I April 1918 before the first combat squad-
ron was assigned to the front. By the time the 1st Division got its
baptism of fire a t Cantigny on 28 May, Pershing could write in his
diary, “Our aviation doing well a t the front.” Only six squadrons had
then been sent forward; by promises of the previous spring, achieve-
ment of the 4,500-plane objective should have been in sight.27
Pershing, at the instigation of some of the air officers, instituted a
thorough reorganization which followed immediately that in the
United States. O n 29 May he appointed as Chief of Air Service Brig.
Gen. Mason M. Patrick, an engineer who had nzver been in an air-
plane. Other officers were transferred, lines of authority were made
more precise, and the whole administrative structure of the Air Serv-
ice was revamped.zs A more modest objective of 2 0 2 combat squad-
rons was substituted for the AEF Aviation Project of 386.’’ The
reorganization proved salutary, and with renewed efforts at home the
Air Service was able to accelerate the rate of deployment of combat
units. By Armistice Day forty-five squadrons had been assigned to
the front.”
But with delays at home and in the AEF’s Zone of the Interior, the
combat echelon could hardly assume the decisive role so confidently
predicted in the spring of 1917. Even a t the war’s end the American
air force was dwarfed by that of the Germans, the British, and the
French. Air Service units were in combat just seven months; during
that time the weekly average of squadrons assigned to the front was
about nineteen. The official Air Service record carried a score of 781
enemy planes shot down for a loss of 289.31 If the scale of combat
activities was limited, the ratio of victories was remarkable for a
fledgling air force. When war was declared, the Aviation Section was
I 1

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.