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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
flown by crews of the 7th Bombardment Group had arrived at Malang.
This was the group that was originally scheduled, and which in fact
had actually begun its movement at the time of Pearl Harbor, for rein-
forcement of the Philippines. Its ground echelon had reached Brisbane
in the convoy arriving there on 2 2 December. The advance element
of its air echelon had flown into Hawaii in the midst of the Japanese
attack of 7 December. Caught thus in movement, its personnel and
planes were put to work as the occasion demanded on the western
coast of the United States, in Hawaii, in Australia, and in Java, and the
unit itself with some of its original personnel finally wound up in
India and China. T w o of the B-17’s arriving at Malang, piloted by
Maj. Kenneth B. Hobson and Lt. Jack W. Hughes, had participated in
the first flight from Hawaii to Australia over the newly opened South
Pacific air route. The other planes had come from the United States
by way of the South Atlantic, Africa, the Middle East, and India.
Five of the newly arrived planes-three LB-3o’s and two B-17’s-
were put immediately into operation. American commanders were
especially concerned over the enemy’s progress north of Java. With
the capture of Manado and Tarakan, Japanese land-based aviation
could operate from fields lying within 350 miles of both Kendari and
Samarinda and thus, not to mention other obvious dangers, could
impose still further limitations on our own air operations. And so on
the morning of 16 January, the day of Combs’ return from Sumatra,
the five recently arrived planes took off from Malang for a mission
against shipping in Manado Bay and against the Langoan airfield,
twenty miles south. Having staged through Kendari, the LB-3o’s were
led by Maj. Austin A. Straubel in an attack on the airfield, while the
B - I ~ smade their runs over the bay. Enemy pursuits reacted vigor-
ously, and subjected the inexperienced American crews to continuing
attacks. Lt. John E. Dougherty crash-landed his badly damaged LB-30
on a tiny island off southern Borneo where the crew, three of whom
had been wounded, was stranded until rescued eight days later by a
Navy PBY. Another LB-30, piloted by Lt. W.E. Bayse, had also
received serious hits and was damaged beyond repair in a forced land-
ing a t Makassar in southern Celebes.37Only one LB-30 and one B-17
returned to Malang. The other B-17 had managed to reach Kendari
on the way back, but Japanese pursuits repeatedly attacked the field
and the American crew, unable to effect necessary repairs, finally
destroyed the plane.38
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