“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
flown by crews of the 7th Bombardment Group had arrived at Malang.
This was the group that was originally scheduled, and which in fact
had actually begun its movement at the time of Pearl Harbor, for rein-
forcement of the Philippines. Its ground echelon had reached Brisbane
in the convoy arriving there on 2 2 December. The advance element
of its air echelon had flown into Hawaii in the midst of the Japanese
attack of 7 December. Caught thus in movement, its personnel and
planes were put to work as the occasion demanded on the western
coast of the United States, in Hawaii, in Australia, and in Java, and the
unit itself with some of its original personnel finally wound up in
India and China. T w o of the B-17’s arriving at Malang, piloted by
Maj. Kenneth B. Hobson and Lt. Jack W. Hughes, had participated in
the first flight from Hawaii to Australia over the newly opened South
Pacific air route. The other planes had come from the United States
by way of the South Atlantic, Africa, the Middle East, and India.
Five of the newly arrived planes-three LB-3o’s and two B-17’s-
were put immediately into operation. American commanders were
especially concerned over the enemy’s progress north of Java. With
the capture of Manado and Tarakan, Japanese land-based aviation
could operate from fields lying within 350 miles of both Kendari and
Samarinda and thus, not to mention other obvious dangers, could
impose still further limitations on our own air operations. And so on
the morning of 16 January, the day of Combs’ return from Sumatra,
the five recently arrived planes took off from Malang for a mission
against shipping in Manado Bay and against the Langoan airfield,
twenty miles south. Having staged through Kendari, the LB-3o’s were
led by Maj. Austin A. Straubel in an attack on the airfield, while the
B - I ~ smade their runs over the bay. Enemy pursuits reacted vigor-
ously, and subjected the inexperienced American crews to continuing
attacks. Lt. John E. Dougherty crash-landed his badly damaged LB-30
on a tiny island off southern Borneo where the crew, three of whom
had been wounded, was stranded until rescued eight days later by a
Navy PBY. Another LB-30, piloted by Lt. W.E. Bayse, had also
received serious hits and was damaged beyond repair in a forced land-
ing a t Makassar in southern Celebes.37Only one LB-30 and one B-17
returned to Malang. The other B-17 had managed to reach Kendari
on the way back, but Japanese pursuits repeatedly attacked the field
and the American crew, unable to effect necessary repairs, finally
destroyed the plane.38
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