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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
flown by crews of the 7th Bombardment Group had arrived at Malang.
This was the group that was originally scheduled, and which in fact
had actually begun its movement at the time of Pearl Harbor, for rein-
forcement of the Philippines. Its ground echelon had reached Brisbane
in the convoy arriving there on 2 2 December. The advance element
of its air echelon had flown into Hawaii in the midst of the Japanese
attack of 7 December. Caught thus in movement, its personnel and
planes were put to work as the occasion demanded on the western
coast of the United States, in Hawaii, in Australia, and in Java, and the
unit itself with some of its original personnel finally wound up in
India and China. T w o of the B-17’s arriving at Malang, piloted by
Maj. Kenneth B. Hobson and Lt. Jack W. Hughes, had participated in
the first flight from Hawaii to Australia over the newly opened South
Pacific air route. The other planes had come from the United States
by way of the South Atlantic, Africa, the Middle East, and India.
Five of the newly arrived planes-three LB-3o’s and two B-17’s-
were put immediately into operation. American commanders were
especially concerned over the enemy’s progress north of Java. With
the capture of Manado and Tarakan, Japanese land-based aviation
could operate from fields lying within 350 miles of both Kendari and
Samarinda and thus, not to mention other obvious dangers, could
impose still further limitations on our own air operations. And so on
the morning of 16 January, the day of Combs’ return from Sumatra,
the five recently arrived planes took off from Malang for a mission
against shipping in Manado Bay and against the Langoan airfield,
twenty miles south. Having staged through Kendari, the LB-3o’s were
led by Maj. Austin A. Straubel in an attack on the airfield, while the
B - I ~ smade their runs over the bay. Enemy pursuits reacted vigor-
ously, and subjected the inexperienced American crews to continuing
attacks. Lt. John E. Dougherty crash-landed his badly damaged LB-30
on a tiny island off southern Borneo where the crew, three of whom
had been wounded, was stranded until rescued eight days later by a
Navy PBY. Another LB-30, piloted by Lt. W.E. Bayse, had also
received serious hits and was damaged beyond repair in a forced land-
ing a t Makassar in southern Celebes.37Only one LB-30 and one B-17
returned to Malang. The other B-17 had managed to reach Kendari
on the way back, but Japanese pursuits repeatedly attacked the field
and the American crew, unable to effect necessary repairs, finally
destroyed the plane.38
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