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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 47 …s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division (strategic reserve), and Italian and Portuguese…
  • p. 113 …Japanese Air Power The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms, had…
  • p. 119 …naval air service, and a colonial air force.” For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost…
  • p. 120 …In its first “combat” test during the thirties the Italian Air Force faced no real opposition…
  • p. 121 …The hope was not fulfilled, for numerous weaknesses in the Italian Air Force rapidly came to…
  • p. 122 …The fundamental weakness of the Italian Air Force was not in its theory of air power…
  • p. 197 …naval forces, and within prescribed boundaries to destroy any German and Italian naval, air, and ground…
  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 554 …Chennault, who since 1937 had been serving as special adviser to the Chinese Air Force. Known…
  • p. 705 …Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, to England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was…
  • p. 752 …USSBS, Japanese Air Power. 9. Notes on the Italian Air Force, in special file of Brig…
  • p. 805 …History, First Air Force. 44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8 May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p…
  • p. 851 …E S Italian Air Force: 82-85; development, Italian East Africa, 84 Italy, Air Ministry, 82…
  • p. 857 …See Italian Air Force. Reinforcements. See theaters. Renault works, 593 Replacement Control Depot, ~ z t h…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
reaching the target area; and with visibility poor, their bombing runs
brought only uncertain r e s u l t ~ . ~
By this time the Japanese had begun their southward move. Tarakan
fell on I I January, and on the same day enemy forces, including para-
troopers, landed a t Manado in upper Celebes. Small Dutch garrisons
resisted as best they could, but naval units which might otherwise have
helped to provide some semblance of a striking force were on convoy
duty to the west, and available air forces were equal only to a token
defense. Australian Hudsons, based on Boeroe and Amboina, American
PBY’s, and Dutch planes struck at the enemy in Celebes, but such hits
as were scored left the enemy force uncrippled, and in the face of stiff
resistance serious losses were sustained by the Allies.33 Against Tara-
kan on the day of its occupation, Major Combs led a mission of seven
B-17’s; but in heavy wind and rain four of the seven were forced to
turn back before reaching the target, and the remaining three, after a
fight with enemy pursuits in which two Japanese planes were shot
down, found the visibility too poor for accurate b ~ m b i n g . ~ ’
The Japanese were now halfway down the Malay Peninsula on
their advance to Singapore, and the next mission of the B-17’s was
flown on orders from the newly established ABDA Command against
the recently captured Sungei Patani airfield on the west coast of the
peninsula, a thousand miles west of their latest target at Tarakan. T h e
distance from Malang again was 1,500 miles, a factor which required
the use of an intermediate field at Palembang in Sumatra. Seven B- I 7’s,
once more led by Combs, flew from Malang to Palembang on 14
January. Equipment for service of the planes there proved to be
seriously inadequate, and experienced maintenance personnel were
lacking. T h e take-off of the planes on 15 January was delayed by
difficulty in refueling and in fuzing unfamiliar Dutch bombs, which
alone were a~ailable.~’Storms buffeted the planes on the 75o-mile
flight from Palembang to Sungei Patani, and two were forced to turn
back. The other five proceeded, relatively free of enemy pursuit and
antiaircraft interference, to make several bomb runs over the target
during which more than twenty hits and several resulting fires were
observed. The bombers returned that night to the Lhoknga emer-
gency field in northern Sumatra, from which they flew to Malang the
following morning. O n this 3,000-mile mission, the only loss was one
B- I 7 damaged beyond repair when landing on rain-soaked Sing~sari.~‘
In the absence of Combs and the B-I 7’s, four LB-~o’sand six B-I 7’s
3 79

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.