The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
inadequate communications frequently left no choice but to send him
out with a general directive and leave him on his own.
In immediate charge of the bombers at Malang was Col. Eugene L.
Eubank of the V Bomber Command. From Malang it was 1,500 miles
to Davao, the first target chosen. T o operate at this distance it would
be necessary to stage through an intermediate base, and of possibilities
at Kendari in Celebes and Samarinda in Borneo, the latter was selected.
Storms and low visibility forced postponement of the initial mission,
but on 3 January nine B-17’s reached Samarinda from Malang. Main-
tenance personnel, who had flown up with the aircrews, then serviced
the planes, loaded each with 2 , 0 0 0 gallons of roo-octane gasoline and
four 600-lb. bombs, and in the early morning of the following day
Maj. Cecil E. Combs led eight of the big planes off the field. H e headed
for Davao Gulf, 730 miles away, which harbored at the time approxi-
mately twelve enemy transports and perhaps twenty-four warships.
As the bombers approached the objective after five hours of flight,
they climbed to 25,000 feet and from this altitude scored hits which
possibly sank a destroyer and, according to enemy accounts, severely
damaged a cruiser. Opposition was slight, and four hours later the
B- I 7’s landed unharmed at Samarinda. The planes returned to Malang
on 5 January.31
Such were bombing operations during the early phase of the Nether-
lands East Indies campaign. Three days of flying had been required to
drop less than ten tons of bombs. The flights were made from unfa-
miliar and inadequately equipped bases, over areas that were imper-
fectly charted, and under circumstances which imposed at all times a
maximum strain upon personnel.
In selecting an advanced staging point for missions, attention had to
be given not only to the location and condition of the field but also to
the availability there of adequate stores of fuel and ammunition. The
one mission through Samarinda had exhausted the supply of IOO-
octane gasoline at that base; moreover, the field’s unpaved runway
could be used by the heavily loaded aircraft only in dry weather.
Accordingly, for a second mission to Davao it was decided to stage
through Kendari, where a store of fuel and generally more satisfactory
facilities existed. Nine of the B- I 7’s having left Malang on 8 January,
Major Combs led them from Kendari on the following day in a second
mission against enemy shipping in Davao Gulf. But mechanical diffi-
culties plagued the flight; of the nine planes, only five succeeded in
378