“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
which had participated in the attacks on Britain’s ill-fated Repulse and
Prince of Wales, was standing by at Saigon with IOO or more planes.
According to one postwar Japanese account, the remainder of the I I th
Air Fleet-presumably the 2 I st Air Flotilla and headquarters detach-
ments-moved to Davao during the first week in January. T h e major
portion of the Second Fleet, having participated in early operations
off both Malaya and the Philippines, was at Formosa from 2 5 Decem-
ber to 15 January. The enemy’s strategy called for the simultaneous
advance of two task forces: an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and
Makassar in Celebes and points on Amboina and Timor; a western
force supported by the 23d Air Flotilla would advance through
Makassar Strait to effect, initially, the occupation of Tarakan, Balik-
papan, and Bandjermasin on the eastern coast of Borneo.28While land
and air forces based on Thailand moved forward to the conquest of
Singapore, a third amphibious task force, supported by carrier-borne
aviation, would establish a strategic outpost to the east at Rabaul in
New Britain.
T o get within closer striking distance of the enemy’s ominous con-
centrations, ten of the fourteen B-17’s which had been withdrawn to
Australia-all that were then in commission-had by I January moved
their base of operations to Java. It had been contemplated at the time
of their withdrawal from the Philippines that they might eventually
operate from Java, and General Brereton on his way to Darwin had
consulted with Dutch officials on this and other questions. The choice
of an American bomber base in Java had fallen on the Singosari air-
field, located approximately five miles northwest of Malang. The field
lacked paved runways, radar defenses, and antiaircraft equipment, but
its sod, which extended some 5,000 feet in length, apparently was firm
enough and quarters were adequate.” Headquarters of the Far East
Air Force remained in Darwin under Col. Francis M. Brady during
days devoted by General Brereton chiefly to consultation with Aus-
tralian, British, and Dutch officials; not until 14 January would Brady
move the headquarters to Java, and another week would elapse before
the final selection of Bandoeng as its l o ~ a t i o n . ~ ’But throughout the
N E I operations, and indeed for many months thereafter in the South-
west Pacific, it would not be uncommon for the tactical commander
at the lower echelon to operate his planes with an extraordinary degree
of independence of higher headquarters; problems of distance and
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