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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
which had participated in the attacks on Britain’s ill-fated Repulse and
Prince of Wales, was standing by at Saigon with IOO or more planes.
According to one postwar Japanese account, the remainder of the I I th
Air Fleet-presumably the 2 I st Air Flotilla and headquarters detach-
ments-moved to Davao during the first week in January. T h e major
portion of the Second Fleet, having participated in early operations
off both Malaya and the Philippines, was at Formosa from 2 5 Decem-
ber to 15 January. The enemy’s strategy called for the simultaneous
advance of two task forces: an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and
Makassar in Celebes and points on Amboina and Timor; a western
force supported by the 23d Air Flotilla would advance through
Makassar Strait to effect, initially, the occupation of Tarakan, Balik-
papan, and Bandjermasin on the eastern coast of Borneo.28While land
and air forces based on Thailand moved forward to the conquest of
Singapore, a third amphibious task force, supported by carrier-borne
aviation, would establish a strategic outpost to the east at Rabaul in
New Britain.
T o get within closer striking distance of the enemy’s ominous con-
centrations, ten of the fourteen B-17’s which had been withdrawn to
Australia-all that were then in commission-had by I January moved
their base of operations to Java. It had been contemplated at the time
of their withdrawal from the Philippines that they might eventually
operate from Java, and General Brereton on his way to Darwin had
consulted with Dutch officials on this and other questions. The choice
of an American bomber base in Java had fallen on the Singosari air-
field, located approximately five miles northwest of Malang. The field
lacked paved runways, radar defenses, and antiaircraft equipment, but
its sod, which extended some 5,000 feet in length, apparently was firm
enough and quarters were adequate.” Headquarters of the Far East
Air Force remained in Darwin under Col. Francis M. Brady during
days devoted by General Brereton chiefly to consultation with Aus-
tralian, British, and Dutch officials; not until 14 January would Brady
move the headquarters to Java, and another week would elapse before
the final selection of Bandoeng as its l o ~ a t i o n . ~ ’But throughout the
N E I operations, and indeed for many months thereafter in the South-
west Pacific, it would not be uncommon for the tactical commander
at the lower echelon to operate his planes with an extraordinary degree
of independence of higher headquarters; problems of distance and
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