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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 258 …order to achieve this end we should cooperate with Japan fully un- quote.” Then: “ I 3…
  • p. 345 …seater aircraft operated by inexperienced personnel in cooperation with antiaircraft search- lights.” la‘ Many important objectives…
  • p. 425 …with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation,” * the ARCADIA conference of the British and American…
  • p. 566 …joined at Dinjan by Col. Merian C. Cooper. The task confronting them, to say the le…
  • p. 596 …There had even been talk of “mutual cooperation” rather than “unity of command.” Some firm decision…
  • p. 629 …the British Isles, to “operate independently in cooperation with the British Bomber Command.” l o Detailed…
  • p. 679 …the fullest agreement with the methods of cooperation which you propose and supremely confident that, at…
  • p. 793 …1942. 36. Ibid. 37. Col. Merian C. Cooper, Briefing 7'8 Officer, First Special Aviation Project…
  • p. 802 …Mar. 1943; talk by Col. M.C. Cooper in Gen. Johnson's Staff Meeting, 2 3…
  • p. 846 …5 5 2 Coolidge, President, 25, 28 Cooper, Col. M.C., 499 Coral Sea. Battle of…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
which had participated in the attacks on Britain’s ill-fated Repulse and
Prince of Wales, was standing by at Saigon with IOO or more planes.
According to one postwar Japanese account, the remainder of the I I th
Air Fleet-presumably the 2 I st Air Flotilla and headquarters detach-
ments-moved to Davao during the first week in January. T h e major
portion of the Second Fleet, having participated in early operations
off both Malaya and the Philippines, was at Formosa from 2 5 Decem-
ber to 15 January. The enemy’s strategy called for the simultaneous
advance of two task forces: an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and
Makassar in Celebes and points on Amboina and Timor; a western
force supported by the 23d Air Flotilla would advance through
Makassar Strait to effect, initially, the occupation of Tarakan, Balik-
papan, and Bandjermasin on the eastern coast of Borneo.28While land
and air forces based on Thailand moved forward to the conquest of
Singapore, a third amphibious task force, supported by carrier-borne
aviation, would establish a strategic outpost to the east at Rabaul in
New Britain.
T o get within closer striking distance of the enemy’s ominous con-
centrations, ten of the fourteen B-17’s which had been withdrawn to
Australia-all that were then in commission-had by I January moved
their base of operations to Java. It had been contemplated at the time
of their withdrawal from the Philippines that they might eventually
operate from Java, and General Brereton on his way to Darwin had
consulted with Dutch officials on this and other questions. The choice
of an American bomber base in Java had fallen on the Singosari air-
field, located approximately five miles northwest of Malang. The field
lacked paved runways, radar defenses, and antiaircraft equipment, but
its sod, which extended some 5,000 feet in length, apparently was firm
enough and quarters were adequate.” Headquarters of the Far East
Air Force remained in Darwin under Col. Francis M. Brady during
days devoted by General Brereton chiefly to consultation with Aus-
tralian, British, and Dutch officials; not until 14 January would Brady
move the headquarters to Java, and another week would elapse before
the final selection of Bandoeng as its l o ~ a t i o n . ~ ’But throughout the
N E I operations, and indeed for many months thereafter in the South-
west Pacific, it would not be uncommon for the tactical commander
at the lower echelon to operate his planes with an extraordinary degree
of independence of higher headquarters; problems of distance and
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.