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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
treme shortage of shipping made it uncertain as to when ground crews
and maintenance facilities could be sent, but it was hoped that the
resources of Australia and personnel evacuated from the Philippines
would make it possible to operate the planes “pending the arrival of
necessary maintenance units.” l 8
By early January the plan had been revised to provide only four
pursuit groups in addition to one light, two medium, and two heavy
bombardment groups.19 But such a revision in the over-all objective
was by no means so significant as a general policy of throwing into the
battle for the Netherlands East Indies every available tactical plane
and crew in the hope that, despite the obvious disadvantages under
which they would be required to operate, they would serve to slow up
if not to stop the main Japanese drive. T h e British and American staffs
in Washington remained unshaken in their decision to regard Ger-
many as the first and most dangerous enemy, but as the US. chiefs
pointed out, the continuing advance of the Japanese argued “for sub-
ordinating everything in the immediate future to the necessity for
getting reinforcements into the ABDA Area.” ‘O It proved impossible
to keep the schedule for the ferrying of bombers; but by 6 January, 2 0
B-17’s and 6 LB-3o’s were en route, an additional 45 B-17’s and 9
LB-jo’s were making ready for the take-off, and arrangements were
being made to forward a total of 160 B-17’s and LB-3o’s as rapidly as
they came off the production line.” Hopes for expediting their move-
ment were raised when 3 B-17’s piloted by Maj. Kenneth B. Hobson
and Lts. Jack W. Hughes and Clarence E. McPherson completed the
first flight from Hawaii to Australia by way of the as yet unfinished
South Pacific route by 1 2 January, though until the fall of Java the
Atlantic and African air routes would remain the chief reliance for
reinforcement of the Far East.22T h e total number of p-40’~reaching
Australia from the United States had been raised by 2 5 January to I I t,
and 160 more arrived within the next ten days.23
Meanwhile, the staffs in Washington struggled with the problem of
shipping. T h e heavy bomber could be flown to its battle station half-
way around the world, even though the air routes it followed were
imperfectly charted and prepared and losses in transit up to 2 5 per
cent were a t times sustained, but other planes must be carried by
water. Water transport was required, too, for the ground crews and
other maintenance personnel, for the men and materials required to
construct and maintain bases, for antiaircraft and other ground forces
3 74

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