“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
Barnes was placed in command of base facilities in Australia, a com-
mand formally assumed by him on 2 7 January.* Meanwhile, Brett had
taken up the duties of deputy commander and intendant general to
Wavell; in the former capacity, he informed the W a r Department on
2 0 January, he would supervise all air activities in the theater, and in
the latter capacity he would be responsible for co-ordination of all
administrative, supply, and maintenance activities for both air and
ground forces.’ When, late in January, Admiral Hart sought relief
from the combined command of naval forces and agreement was
reached on Dutch Vice Adm. Conrad E.L. Helfrich as his successor,
it was suggested by the President that Brett might replace Peirse in
the air command, thus assuring continuance of a representative of the
United States in one of the major operational commands. But Brett
himself, who recently had been promoted to lieutenant general and
whose position as deputy to Wavell gave him wide influence, objected
to the unsettling effect of a “drastic change” at that time, and when
Helfrich replaced Hart on 14 February, Peirse remained in the air
command.1° There had been an understandable confusion at the out-
set; and equally understandable, there were times when in the heat of
battle national jealousies found momentary expression.” But the
American officers were left with no uncertainty regarding the extent
of their obligation to this new type of combined effort. As General
Marshall informed Brereton by radio in January, it was the W a r
Department’s fixed policy to seek the enemy’s defeat by a unified
effort under the leadership of General Wavell. Brereton’s mission, as
Marshall succinctly added, was to execute the orders issued by
Wavell.’
A natural division of effort gave to the British a primary responsibil-
ity for defense of Burma and the Malay States and to the Americans
the major responsibility for the air defenses of the Netherlands East
Indies. The Netherlands government had at hand a regular army of
some 40,000 men and, in addition, perhaps IOO,OOO native troops; of
necessity these forces would constitute for the time being the main
resistance on the ground. T h e Dutch command, recognizing its inabil-
ity to defend all of the islands, had posted small garrisons at strategic
points throughout the Indies, principally to carry out necessary demoli-
tions before withdrawal, and had concentrated its main strength on
Java. Here numerous airdromes had been prepared: military fields at
Kalid jati, Bandoeng, Magelang, Madioen, Malang, Batavia, and Soera-
37’