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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 387 …the route over which the Far East Air Force had received its thirty-five heavy bombers…
  • p. 551 …Formerly commander of the Far East Air Force in the Philip- * See above, pp. 396-97…
  • p. 561 …of an air force, depended upon a line of communications extending across the Indian and At…
  • p. 570 …the American air force would be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 577 …involved in estab- lishing and operating an air force in Asia. The report of the Grady…
  • p. 630 …Policy for Disposition of US and British Air Forces.” l6 This memorandum greatly extended the scope…
  • p. 797 …MacArthur argued that now was a pro- pitious moment to rush forces from the Indian and…
  • p. 819 …5 8 - 6 7 Eighth Air Force, I, 326ff.; Achtung Indianer, a history of VIII FC…
  • p. 850 …See also CBI; Air Forces, Tenth AF. 336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
Barnes was placed in command of base facilities in Australia, a com-
mand formally assumed by him on 2 7 January.* Meanwhile, Brett had
taken up the duties of deputy commander and intendant general to
Wavell; in the former capacity, he informed the W a r Department on
2 0 January, he would supervise all air activities in the theater, and in
the latter capacity he would be responsible for co-ordination of all
administrative, supply, and maintenance activities for both air and
ground forces.’ When, late in January, Admiral Hart sought relief
from the combined command of naval forces and agreement was
reached on Dutch Vice Adm. Conrad E.L. Helfrich as his successor,
it was suggested by the President that Brett might replace Peirse in
the air command, thus assuring continuance of a representative of the
United States in one of the major operational commands. But Brett
himself, who recently had been promoted to lieutenant general and
whose position as deputy to Wavell gave him wide influence, objected
to the unsettling effect of a “drastic change” at that time, and when
Helfrich replaced Hart on 14 February, Peirse remained in the air
command.1° There had been an understandable confusion at the out-
set; and equally understandable, there were times when in the heat of
battle national jealousies found momentary expression.” But the
American officers were left with no uncertainty regarding the extent
of their obligation to this new type of combined effort. As General
Marshall informed Brereton by radio in January, it was the W a r
Department’s fixed policy to seek the enemy’s defeat by a unified
effort under the leadership of General Wavell. Brereton’s mission, as
Marshall succinctly added, was to execute the orders issued by
Wavell.’
A natural division of effort gave to the British a primary responsibil-
ity for defense of Burma and the Malay States and to the Americans
the major responsibility for the air defenses of the Netherlands East
Indies. The Netherlands government had at hand a regular army of
some 40,000 men and, in addition, perhaps IOO,OOO native troops; of
necessity these forces would constitute for the time being the main
resistance on the ground. T h e Dutch command, recognizing its inabil-
ity to defend all of the islands, had posted small garrisons at strategic
points throughout the Indies, principally to carry out necessary demoli-
tions before withdrawal, and had concentrated its main strength on
Java. Here numerous airdromes had been prepared: military fields at
Kalid jati, Bandoeng, Magelang, Madioen, Malang, Batavia, and Soera-
37’

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.