“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
tion of commanders for the combined naval and air forces might
require a decision by the governments ~ o n c e r n e d . ~
Actually, the major problems confronted in establishing the com-
mand proceeded chiefly from the novelty of the undertaking, the
extreme demand for haste, the vastness of the area involved, the
absence of adequate communications facilities, and the lack of other
aids which could have been provided only through long and careful
planning. Inevitably, the early days were marked by confusion and
uncertainty as to procedural and other channels. Chief among the
American officers identified with the command were Adm. Thomas C.
Hart, commanding the U.S. Asiatic Fleet; Maj. Gen. George H. Brett,
who on 3 I December had arrived in Australia to assume command of
United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA); his chief of
staff, Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes; and Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton,
in command of the remnants of the U.S. Far East Air Force.” General
Brett apparently had already been selected as Wavell’s deputy when
in the second week of January he flew to Java for a conference with
the supreme commander. By 1 2 January, General Brereton had been
directed by the War Department to assume vice Brett the command
of USAFIA, but a t approximately the same time Brereton also
received appointment as deputy chief of air staff for ABDA.5 Though
the burden of this latter assignment would be lessened upon the arrival
of Air Marshal Sir Richard E.C. Peirse, who had been selected as air
commander (ABDAIR) for ABDA,t Wavell insisted that two such
assignments, one in Australia and the other in Java, were too much for
one man to carry.‘ General Marshall already had suggested that Brett
might “volunteer” to assume some of Brereton’s duties pending Peirse’s
arrival, but Wavell pointed out that in addition to a considerable
responsibility for the operational direction of the air forces, General
Brett would be responsible for lines of supply both from Australia and
from India. Indeed, it was Wavell’s feeling that Brett should have the
additional assistance of some air officer of high rank in Australia who
would take charge of that section of the supply route supporting the
ABDA 0perations.I
Accordingly, on 17 January Brereton was designated by the War
Department as commanding general of American tactical forces in the
ABDA area, which of course would be largely air forces, and General
‘See above, pp. 226-3 I .
t Peirse assumed command on 28 January.
3 7 0