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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
bombers to the Philippines and for the development of installations
essential to the South Pacific air route; an exchange of visits between
American, British, Dutch, and Australian officers had occurred; and
commitments had been made for a sharing of intelligence and of the
responsibility for reconnaissance to facilitate close co-operation.
Indeed, by November 1941 the threatening crisis in relations with
Japan had brought a general agreement extending somewhat beyond
a policy merely of co-operation: the commanders of the British Far
Eastern Fleet and the American Asiatic Fleet were to draft a joint
plan of naval operations with a view to its expansion by consultation
with the Dutch into a three-power plan of action; air and ground
commanders-American, British, and Dutch-similarly were to pre-
pare joint plans for operations to be co-ordinated where necessary
with those of the naval forces; close liaison was to be maintained
between all major headquarters, logistical facilities would be shared,
and local commanders might agree upon unity of command for par-
ticular task forces.’ T h e march of events allowed little time for the
perfection of these plans. But a beginning had been made; and under
the impact of an emergency far more serious than any that had been
anticipated, the principle of unity of command already agreed upon
as a basic feature of Anglo-American collaboration was accepted by
the associated powers in the Pacific.
The ABDA Command
Responding to General Marshall’s argument that “a man with good
judgment and unity of command has a distinct advantage over a man
with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation,” * the
ARCADIA conference of the British and American chiefs of staff on
2 9 December considered a draft directive for a supreme commander of
the so-called ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) area.” O n
the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald
Wavell of his selection as supreme commander, and by 2 January a
directive for the new command had been approved tentatively by the
President and the Prime M i n i ~ t e r . ~T h e newly established theater
included Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philip-
pines. As supreme commander, General Wavell was to hold Burma
and the Malay barrier-a line presumably well anchored at Singapore
For a discussion of this and other action of the ARCADrA conference with
reference to the over-all strategy of the war, see above, Chapter 7.
367

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