Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 387 …the route over which the Far East Air Force had received its thirty-five heavy bombers…
  • p. 551 …Formerly commander of the Far East Air Force in the Philip- * See above, pp. 396-97…
  • p. 561 …of an air force, depended upon a line of communications extending across the Indian and At…
  • p. 570 …the American air force would be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 577 …involved in estab- lishing and operating an air force in Asia. The report of the Grady…
  • p. 630 …Policy for Disposition of US and British Air Forces.” l6 This memorandum greatly extended the scope…
  • p. 797 …MacArthur argued that now was a pro- pitious moment to rush forces from the Indian and…
  • p. 819 …5 8 - 6 7 Eighth Air Force, I, 326ff.; Achtung Indianer, a history of VIII FC…
  • p. 850 …See also CBI; Air Forces, Tenth AF. 336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
bombers to the Philippines and for the development of installations
essential to the South Pacific air route; an exchange of visits between
American, British, Dutch, and Australian officers had occurred; and
commitments had been made for a sharing of intelligence and of the
responsibility for reconnaissance to facilitate close co-operation.
Indeed, by November 1941 the threatening crisis in relations with
Japan had brought a general agreement extending somewhat beyond
a policy merely of co-operation: the commanders of the British Far
Eastern Fleet and the American Asiatic Fleet were to draft a joint
plan of naval operations with a view to its expansion by consultation
with the Dutch into a three-power plan of action; air and ground
commanders-American, British, and Dutch-similarly were to pre-
pare joint plans for operations to be co-ordinated where necessary
with those of the naval forces; close liaison was to be maintained
between all major headquarters, logistical facilities would be shared,
and local commanders might agree upon unity of command for par-
ticular task forces.’ T h e march of events allowed little time for the
perfection of these plans. But a beginning had been made; and under
the impact of an emergency far more serious than any that had been
anticipated, the principle of unity of command already agreed upon
as a basic feature of Anglo-American collaboration was accepted by
the associated powers in the Pacific.
The ABDA Command
Responding to General Marshall’s argument that “a man with good
judgment and unity of command has a distinct advantage over a man
with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation,” * the
ARCADIA conference of the British and American chiefs of staff on
2 9 December considered a draft directive for a supreme commander of
the so-called ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) area.” O n
the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald
Wavell of his selection as supreme commander, and by 2 January a
directive for the new command had been approved tentatively by the
President and the Prime M i n i ~ t e r . ~T h e newly established theater
included Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philip-
pines. As supreme commander, General Wavell was to hold Burma
and the Malay barrier-a line presumably well anchored at Singapore
For a discussion of this and other action of the ARCADrA conference with
reference to the over-all strategy of the war, see above, Chapter 7.
367

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.