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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 44 …By Armistice Day forty-five squadrons had been assigned to the front.” But with delays at…
  • p. 47 …up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division…
  • p. 48 …One day mission was sufficiently large and suc- cessful to draw more than passing attention. O…
  • p. 80 …resignation from the Army came on the day after T R 440-15 was published. But…
  • p. 186 …War Plans Division to prepare the estimate independently as an Air Staff agency rather than as…
  • p. 258 …Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know than unless the US has not oppressed…
  • p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
  • p. 435 …Brady during days devoted by General Brereton chiefly to consultation with Aus- tralian, British, and Dutch…
  • p. 710 …During World War I, American military forces in Europe had achieved organizational and operational independence, but…
C H A P T E R 10
* * * * * * * * * * *
LOSS OF THE NETHERLANDS
EAST INDIES
Y THE end of December 1941 the Japanese, in addition to
striking the United States Navy a crippling blow at Pearl Har-
B bor, had destroyed for all practical purposes the Far East AirForce, had driven the American Asiatic Fleet, together with the rem-
nants of Patwing 10, from its Philippine base to the Netherlands East
Indies, had accomplished the virtual isolation of General MacArthur’s
troops on Bataan and Corregidor, and were well on the way to com-
plete encirclement of the Philippines. Already they had landed in
Borneo as a part of the encircling movement and as the initial
encroachment on the fabulously wealthy Netherlands East Indies.
Simultaneously, they had forced the capitulation of the British garrison
a t Hong Kong and had penetrated Thailand, where, meeting only a
token resistance, they promptly began to assemble the forces for
drives into Burma and the Malay States that would end in the fall of
Rangoon and Singapore. As much as the Americans would have liked
to put the issue to a test in the Philippines, the battle now was for
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.
Hope of barring the way to further advances in the skillfully
directed and sensationally successful Japanese drive depended upon an
effective co-ordination of effort by hastily assembled and ill-prepared
American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces. Unhappily, prewar
consultation among the interested staffs had not been advanced to a
point comparable to that reached in the American-British conversa-
tions regarding common problems in the Atlantic. Through the
months immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, however, significant
steps toward effective collaboration had been taken. Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.