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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
C H A P T E R 10
* * * * * * * * * * *
LOSS OF THE NETHERLANDS
EAST INDIES
Y THE end of December 1941 the Japanese, in addition to
striking the United States Navy a crippling blow at Pearl Har-
B bor, had destroyed for all practical purposes the Far East AirForce, had driven the American Asiatic Fleet, together with the rem-
nants of Patwing 10, from its Philippine base to the Netherlands East
Indies, had accomplished the virtual isolation of General MacArthur’s
troops on Bataan and Corregidor, and were well on the way to com-
plete encirclement of the Philippines. Already they had landed in
Borneo as a part of the encircling movement and as the initial
encroachment on the fabulously wealthy Netherlands East Indies.
Simultaneously, they had forced the capitulation of the British garrison
a t Hong Kong and had penetrated Thailand, where, meeting only a
token resistance, they promptly began to assemble the forces for
drives into Burma and the Malay States that would end in the fall of
Rangoon and Singapore. As much as the Americans would have liked
to put the issue to a test in the Philippines, the battle now was for
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.
Hope of barring the way to further advances in the skillfully
directed and sensationally successful Japanese drive depended upon an
effective co-ordination of effort by hastily assembled and ill-prepared
American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces. Unhappily, prewar
consultation among the interested staffs had not been advanced to a
point comparable to that reached in the American-British conversa-
tions regarding common problems in the Atlantic. Through the
months immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, however, significant
steps toward effective collaboration had been taken. Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.