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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G
twin-engine transports. Cargo handled amounted to approximately
2 , 0 0 0 tons in May and 2 , 5 0 0 tons in June.’”
For several months after war began, there was no serious overlap-
ping of the transport activities of the Ferrying Command and the Air
Service Command. T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter, at least in the beginning, confined
its own transport activities to the domestic field. But when the Air
Service Command began extending its operations beyond the borders
of the United States, areas of duplication developed, and by March
1942 the need arose for a clear division of responsibility. O n 24 March,
Generai Arnold issued a directive assigning to the Air Service Com-
mand responsibility for transporting aviation technical supplies to
points within the Western Hemisphere, including Alaska, the Carib-
bean area, Greenland, and Iceland. As soon as possible it was to
inaugurate a transport service to Honolulu. T h e Ferrying Command
was given control of all air transport services beyond the Western
Hemisphere and, for the time being, it was to control all ferrying of
aircraft within the United States and to overseas destinations. It will
be noted that the Ferrying Command’s title to its basic function of
ferrying aircraft within and beyond the United States was rendered
somewhat uncertain by the phrase “for the time being.” Furthermore,
the proposed Air Service Command operation to Honolulu would
have been in contravention of the Ferrying Command’s responsibility
to operate all transport services extending outside the Western Hemi-
sphere.186
Obviously, the whole arrangement was only a temporary expedient,
but nothing further in the way of clarification was attempted until
Jiine. By that time it had become apparent that the division of author-
ity given on 2 4 March had resulted, to quote General Arnold, in
“substantial duplication of effort and a confusing dual responsibil-
ity.” 1 8 7 Mr. L.W. Pogue, chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
in a memorandum dated 1 5 June, gave a detailed and trenchant
description of the confusion and duplication then prevalent in the
field of military air transport. H e expressed the opinion that the ideal
solution would be the creation of a new command, independent of
both the Army and the Navy, which should control practically all
military air transport operations. As a less desirable but more feasible
step he recommended that, a t the least, all air transport services within
the Army be unified under one command.lss
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