“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G
twin-engine transports. Cargo handled amounted to approximately
2 , 0 0 0 tons in May and 2 , 5 0 0 tons in June.’”
For several months after war began, there was no serious overlap-
ping of the transport activities of the Ferrying Command and the Air
Service Command. T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter, at least in the beginning, confined
its own transport activities to the domestic field. But when the Air
Service Command began extending its operations beyond the borders
of the United States, areas of duplication developed, and by March
1942 the need arose for a clear division of responsibility. O n 24 March,
Generai Arnold issued a directive assigning to the Air Service Com-
mand responsibility for transporting aviation technical supplies to
points within the Western Hemisphere, including Alaska, the Carib-
bean area, Greenland, and Iceland. As soon as possible it was to
inaugurate a transport service to Honolulu. T h e Ferrying Command
was given control of all air transport services beyond the Western
Hemisphere and, for the time being, it was to control all ferrying of
aircraft within the United States and to overseas destinations. It will
be noted that the Ferrying Command’s title to its basic function of
ferrying aircraft within and beyond the United States was rendered
somewhat uncertain by the phrase “for the time being.” Furthermore,
the proposed Air Service Command operation to Honolulu would
have been in contravention of the Ferrying Command’s responsibility
to operate all transport services extending outside the Western Hemi-
sphere.186
Obviously, the whole arrangement was only a temporary expedient,
but nothing further in the way of clarification was attempted until
Jiine. By that time it had become apparent that the division of author-
ity given on 2 4 March had resulted, to quote General Arnold, in
“substantial duplication of effort and a confusing dual responsibil-
ity.” 1 8 7 Mr. L.W. Pogue, chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
in a memorandum dated 1 5 June, gave a detailed and trenchant
description of the confusion and duplication then prevalent in the
field of military air transport. H e expressed the opinion that the ideal
solution would be the creation of a new command, independent of
both the Army and the Navy, which should control practically all
military air transport operations. As a less desirable but more feasible
step he recommended that, a t the least, all air transport services within
the Army be unified under one command.lss
3 61