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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor- rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
  • p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of World W a r I…
  • p. 47 …being made up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the French…
  • p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been established with its…
  • p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force, usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
  • p. 114 …I when a British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to assist…
  • p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the RAF, which was able to gain…
  • p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
  • p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain The German bombing of Britain in World…
  • p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for many years, like that in the…
  • p. 131 …it was hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off any German…
  • p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air over rhe…
  • p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug- gest that the…
  • p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis- persed as were…
  • p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under- standing ally. It is…
  • p. 171 …British requirements amounted to 49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
  • p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
  • p. 290 …to prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This project was…
  • p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF, magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt, rapidly went beyond the…
  • p. 341 …enjoyed through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com- pare results with those…
  • p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
  • p. 369 …The majority of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com- mand…
  • p. 391 …of its production was required by the RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
  • p. 398 …an initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of Germany. Questions remained regarding…
  • p. 404 …air force personnel were concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on the…
  • p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs, and cadres of American pilots and ground…
  • p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
  • p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
  • p. 557 …Even when the enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and A…
  • p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal run should be between the RAF base a…
  • p. 566 …Unable to challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF and A V…
  • p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese were using…
  • p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the War Department…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
  • p. 610 …Fleet Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained for sea search and…
  • p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
  • p. 615 …it had been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only leads to…
  • p. 619 …On the tactical side, valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew which flew two…
  • p. 626 …bomber crews flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy airfields." During the seven…
  • p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut was contemplated; and…
  • p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
  • p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
  • p. 634 …T o the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive had figured as…
  • p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
  • p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
  • p. 637 …I ) allocate to Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according to an…
  • p. 647 …TRIGGER, a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
  • p. 648 …important fea- tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp cleavage…
  • p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking…
  • p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with- out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
  • p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be made for two chains of command-that of the…
  • p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ; and while it provided…
  • p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air Force…
  • p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF. Daylight or Dark? As an argument in favor…
  • p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5 It is significant that this…
  • p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close support for ground operations in…
  • p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF bomber offensive and criticized…
  • p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined attack on Germany, the RAF…
  • p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for strategic bombardment, an attitude…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
of that for May consisted of what the railroads describe as “company
traffic,” that is, supplies and equipment for Northwest’s own stations.
Part of the remainder was carried for the engineers a t work on the
Alaskan highway.lT3
T w o other airlines began operations in the northwest during the
spring of 1942,both under the supervision of the Air Service Com-
mand. In mid-April, Western Air Lines opened a contract service
from points in the United States to Edmonton, Alberta. The service
was established primarily to transport cargo from air depots within
the United States to Edmonton, but it also furnished a connecting link
by means of which returning ferrying crews were able to get from
Northwest Airlines’ facilities at Edmonton to commercial facilities at
Great Falls, M ~ n t a n a . ” ~A subsidiary of United Air Lines was
awarded a contract on 4 April 1942 to operate two DC-3’s on a one-
trip-a-week basis from air depots at Dayton, Ohio, and Ogden, Utah,
to Fairbanks by way of Edmonton. The first survey flights were flown
on 17 April, and regular service began on 1 5 May.175A new contract
with United, approved on 25 June, authorized additional services from
Dayton to Anchorage, Alaska, aIrd from Edmonton to Anchorage.17’
The developing Japanese threat to the Aleutians in late May 1942
and the actual attack early in June brought about a sudden and rapid
increase in both transport and ferrying operations along the north-
west route. Existing transport schedules were speeded up and the
routes extended and, in addition, the personnel and resources of other
airlines were hastily mobilized for emergency support to military
forces in Alaska. On 13 June, eleven airlines were ordered to send all
available planes to Edmonton. Commercial schedules were canceled,
passengers were dropped at the nearest airport, crews took off without
even changes of clothing, and within the next several days forty-six
airplanes were concentrated at the Edmonton base. Routes were
quickly assigned. Northwest continued to fly its existing routes with
an extension to Dayton and Anchorage. United Air Lines concen-
trated on the routes from Patterson Field, Ohio, to Anchorage and
from Salt Lake City to Fairbanks. Pennsylvania Central shuttled
between Dayton and Edmonton. The other airlines flew cargo from
various air depots in the United States to Alaskan points. Both North-
west and United made numerous trips to Nome, particularly in the
last days of June when Japanese activity was reported in the vicinity.
The garrison at Nome was built up overnight, entirely by air.177
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.