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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over- seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
  • p. 53 …this department in operations over land and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
  • p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
  • p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
  • p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the Army, which “with its own air…
  • p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational radius of aircraft. In 1920…
  • p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
  • p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
  • p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro- tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
  • p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in contradistinction…
  • p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
  • p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing seaward reconnaissance units…
  • p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
  • p. 107 …It is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other air…
  • p. 108 …a great nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
  • p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can- not but incline to…
  • p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
  • p. 118 …they made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained personnel. In the matter…
  • p. 119 …As opposed to land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than the…
  • p. 127 …Recon- naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations. The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
  • p. 128 …in combined operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French military traditions, however…
  • p. 133 …Atlantic and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved a moderate degree…
  • p. 138 …tradi- tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern- ment the…
  • p. 154 …Such additions to a com- bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have imposed…
  • p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit- terly resented Air Corps…
  • p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land areas from which enemy air power…
  • p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 177 …Near East, India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical support of these widely…
  • p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica- tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
  • p. 188 …And to protect the security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
  • p. 198 …and to insure the safety of essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
  • p. 199 …Base commander, included inde- pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land and…
  • p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis- tributed among the military fields and installations…
  • p. 204 …and against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission was to support…
  • p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
  • p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com- munications a t a time when shipping…
  • p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming the general assumption that some major move…
  • p. 246 …But as the day advanced the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed in…
  • p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese officials interviewed after the…
  • p. 257 …a fruitless flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been From this…
  • p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their search over the South China Sea…
  • p. 268 …depots had been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk and other naval craft…
  • p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
  • p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
  • p. 288 …maintenance of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes; forging and tightening a…
  • p. 323 …This drastic shift in the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
  • p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
  • p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner- able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
  • p. 329 …They were enemy planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
  • p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
  • p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
  • p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier." It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
  • p. 362 …provide for the security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over 3…
  • p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
  • p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
  • p. 372 …around Africa and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
  • p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over- seas operations, while the latter…
  • p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the South Pacific, and…
  • p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Natal toward the end of June, at which time the operation came under
the control of the newly created Air Transport Command.la5 With
the build-up of the two-engine services to Natal, it became possible to
concentrate the four-engine transports on the Atlantic crossing where
full advantage could be taken of their capacity for carrying heavy
payloads on long-range flights. By June the Pan American Clippers
were flying only the transoceanic leg of the route except for necessary
trips back to New York for inspection and overhaul. In the same
month five new B-qD's, flown by military crews of the Ferrying
Command, were placed on the South Atlantic crossing. During the
spring and early summer of 1942, heavy backlogs of cargo and pas-
sengers had piled up at both Miami and Natal, reaching almost un-
manageable proportions; but the increased number of planes in use
by June and the more frequent schedules made it possible to reduce
the backlogs gradually and to assure thereafter a more even flow of
traffic to Africa, India, and China.166
Throughout the first half of 1942, and, indeed, until considerably
later, the South Atlantic remained by far the most important of the
overseas air transport routes, just as it supported the heaviest ferried
traffic during the same period. Other routes, however, were being
opened, and some eventually carried a heavier flow of air traffic than
the route to Africa and southern Asia. In the North Atlantic, as we
have seen, new contract services were inaugurated during the winter
and spring of 1942 in order, first, to speed the completion of air bases
in preparation for the movement of the Eighth Air Force, and, when
this was accomplished, to support the movement itself and to estab-
lish regularly scheduled services into Great Britain. Under terms of
a contract of 3 I January I 942, Northeast Airlines, equipped originally
with two C-53's, opened a transport service to Goose Bay in mid-
February and to Greenland in the early spring. Northeast sent its first
flight into Iceland in May, and in July, with more planes available,
extended its operations to Prestwick, Scotland.'" American Airlines
entered into a contract with the government, approved on 4 April
1942, to provide a transport service between New York and Rey-
kjavik, Iceland. Originally undertaken for the Air Service Command,
the operation passed to the control of the Air Transport Command
early in July.168O n 13 April, Transcontinental & Western Air dis-
patched its first Stratoliner flight over the North Atlantic to the
United Kingdom, thus reopening a through service that had been
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.