“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G
already existed. Fortunately, they did exist and could be quickly
harnessed for military purposes.147
As early as 1936 the Air Transport Association of America, the
trade organization of the civil airlines, working in conjunction with
the Air Corps and the Army W a r College, had formulated a plan for
the mobilization of the airlines in case of war. T h e plan had been kept
up to date during the intervening years, and after Pearl Harbor it pro-
vided a broad program for the wartime utilization of the civil aviation
resources of the However, the emergency expansion of
overseas transport services in the early months of the war grew out
of immediate and specific needs, and was not based on carefully laid
plans drawn up in advance. First there was the need for rushing emer-
gency supplies by way of Africa to the Philippines and to China, then
of supporting the heavy bomber ferrying movement to the Southwest
Pacific, and at the same time increasing the flow of lend-lease supplies
to the Middle East to bolster British and Russian resistance. Soon after
7 December, it became necessary to open air transport services to the
air bases under construction in the upper Atlantic area, and by the
spring of 1942 to establish regularly scheduled flights to Britain,
Alaska, Australia, Panama, and the Caribbean area. Expansion on a
piecemeal basis and under emergency conditions continued until the
summer of 1942. Then, with the growing realization of the poten-
tialities of air transportation, the concentration of control of air trans-
port services in a single command of the Army Air Forces, and the
great increase in the number of available aircraft and crews, it became
possible to undertake a more orderly development in accordance with
needs shaped by the long-range plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the several theater commander^.'^'
As a first step in mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President
Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December 1941direct-
ing the Secretary of War to take possession of any portion of any
civil aviation system required in the war effort.15' Also on the 13th,
the lend-lease administrator allocated twenty-five million dollars to
the W a r Department and authorized it to enter into commitments up
to that amount for the purchase of available four-engine aircraft, spare
parts, equipment, and facilities for construction or for any other
purposes necessary to the extension and operation of air transport
services.'51
In establishing new overseas services, the most pressing need of both
3 5 '