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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 326 …The inland route offered better weather, but north of Edmonton * See above, pp. 166-70. t…
  • p. 416 …On 13 June, eleven airlines were ordered to send all available planes to Edmonton. Commercial schedules…
  • p. 417 …less, and when the crews returned to Edmonton they were an exhausted, unshaven, red-eyed lot…
  • p. 847 …Eastern Theater of Operations, 294 Econoniic Warfare, Board of, 256 Ecuador, 1 2 5 , 301 Edmonton…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
route by both the Ferrying Command and the contract airlines. These
flights went only as far as Goose Bay during the winter, but by April
they were going all the way to the British Isles. Early in April, Lt. Col.
Milton W. Arnold, a member of the Ferrying Command operations
staff, was ordered to make a general survey of the route and to deter-
mine the feasibility of flying fighter aircraft to Britain. His report was
altogether pessimistic, although he raised no question as to the possi-
bility of ferrying the lighter types of aircraft. H e found operational
facilities generally, and especially those for weather and communica-
tions services, as yet in a low state of efficiency. Colonel Arnold recom-
mended that a qualified officer be given the job of flying the route
continuously, armed with full authority by the W a r Department to
take whatever corrective action might be found necessary. Arnold
himself was given the job by Army Air Forces but his authority was
limited to that of recommending, rather than ordering, remedial action
to correct existing deficiencies. Accompanied by the regional weather
and communications officers, he kept the route under constant surveil-
lance during the months immediately preceding the movement of the
Eighth Air Force and monitored the earliest flights after the movement
started.'
As an example of some of the fundamental problems still remaining
to be overcome, it may be noted that on one of the survey flights dur-
ing May Arnold found practically no weather information was being
relayed between Iceland, Greenland, and eastern Canada, even though
stations were scattered all through the area a t that time. "Actual mes-
sages were found in which forecasts were requested from Gander and
Presque Isle and were delivered fifteen days later to Greenland, and
in another case, twenty-nine days later.77140Little more than a month
remained before the scheduled movement of the Eighth was to begin,
a movement that obviously would be impossible under such conditions.
Arnold and his associates worked continually a t the job of instructing
inexperienced weather and radio personnel, replacing those altogether
unqualified, installing new radio equipment, and devising a simpler
weather code.14' Considerable improvement had been made by late
June, though the organization of fully dependable weather and com-
munications services continued to demand the attention of responsible
officers.
T h e story of the actual movement of the air echelon of the Eighth
Air Force across the North Atlantic to the British Isles will be con-
348

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.