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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 responsibility of the Chief Signal Officer, who did not have a con- trolling voice in production of materiel. Both these functions, for Army aviation, were under jurisdiction of the War Department but without clear-cut lines of responsibility or arrangements for co-ordi- nation. The General Staff was without experience in formulating air policies and more interested in other matters. Hence, in effect, the air program assumed a position of semidetachment from the rest of the war effort with a shaky organization and with no precedent to serve as a guide.15 With an ample purse but no precise knowledge of their aviation requirements, American leaders had to turn to the European Allies for advice. The counsel received was not always divorced from selfish national and private interests, and it was rarely given with a true un- derstanding of the situation in America. Co-ordination with the over- all military program was faulty. On recommendation of an American mission sent to Europe in June under newly commissioned Col. Raynal C. Bolling, it was decided to forego for the present the develop- ment of purely American designs and the manufacture of pursuit planes, whose models changed too rapidly for standardization in fac- tories so distantly removed from the front. Toward fulfilling the objectives set for July 1918 the United States should concentrate mainly on production of trainers, of the English-designed De Havil- land 4, a two-place reconnaissance-bomber, and of the newly devel- oped Liberty engine. Other types, including pursuits in great numbers, were to be purchased abroad.16 An extensive training program was inaugurated, entailing the use of American universities for ground- school work and newly built fields for primary flight instruction. Advanced training was for the most part scheduled for overseas schools, where combat experience of the Allies could be more readily exploited. Instruction of mechanics was similarly divided between American and European The program got off to a late start and suffered a number of unan- ticipated interruptions. Amid the general confusion which character- ized the early war effort, aviation was especially handicapped by slow communications between the combat line and the factory, by lack of centralized control, and by difficulties inherent in attempting to build an aircraft industry overnight. Public hopes, fanned by reports more enthusiastic than accurate, continued high throughout 19 I 7. Early in the new year, amid the widespread criticism of the adminis- 8
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.