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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
and movement of the project. This consultation proved advantageous,
for when the aircraft reached Morrison Field very little time was lost
in last-minute processing. The detachment was organized into three
flight echelons of 7-8-8 aircraft, with flights spaced about two days
apart in order not to overcrowd facilities along the route. A few of
the aircraft were delayed briefly but caught up with their flights, and
all three echelons arrived in the Middle East on schedule. Altogether,
it was a highly successful operation and pointed the way to improved
methods of handling mass flights of aircraft in the future.l'O
The North Atlantic Route
Through the winter and spring of 1942, as aircraft moved in in-
creasing numbers over the South Atlantic to the Middle East and
beyond, the upper Atlantic area was the scene of hurried and at times
almost frantic preparation for an air movement that would permit the
weight of American air power to be thrown against the Germans a t
the earliest possible moment. The American and British chiefs at the
ARCADIA conference had reaffirmed their faith in a strategy which
assigned priority to the European theater and gave to the AAF an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding the timing and the scale of
that effort, but there was no question as to the necessity for prompt
action to prepare for the movement by air of AAF units to the British
Isles. That preparation called primarily for a more adequate develop-
ment of North Atlantic air routes.
The principal need was to complete facilities along a more northern
route than that originally put into service by the Canadians and the
British in 1940-0ne that would take full advantage of the stepping-
stones provided by Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland
for the purpose of ferrying shorter-range planes to Europe. The
British and Canadian governments had been the first to develop plans
for such a far northern route and had made initial surveys when
the passage of the Lend-Lease Act early in 1941 lent new importance
to the project and when, a t the same time, plans for an eastward ex-
tension of hemispheric defenses by the United States and Canada gave
to the undertaking still stronger support." 'I2
Original British-Canadian plans contemplated a route running from
Gander Lake, Newfoundland, to a proposed base in southern Green-
* See above, Chap. 4.
3 4 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.