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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor- rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
  • p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of World W a r I…
  • p. 47 …being made up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the French…
  • p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been established with its…
  • p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force, usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
  • p. 114 …I when a British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to assist…
  • p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the RAF, which was able to gain…
  • p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
  • p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain The German bombing of Britain in World…
  • p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for many years, like that in the…
  • p. 131 …it was hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off any German…
  • p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air over rhe…
  • p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug- gest that the…
  • p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis- persed as were…
  • p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under- standing ally. It is…
  • p. 171 …British requirements amounted to 49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
  • p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
  • p. 290 …to prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This project was…
  • p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF, magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt, rapidly went beyond the…
  • p. 341 …enjoyed through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com- pare results with those…
  • p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
  • p. 369 …The majority of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com- mand…
  • p. 391 …of its production was required by the RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
  • p. 398 …an initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of Germany. Questions remained regarding…
  • p. 404 …air force personnel were concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on the…
  • p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs, and cadres of American pilots and ground…
  • p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
  • p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
  • p. 557 …Even when the enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and A…
  • p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal run should be between the RAF base a…
  • p. 566 …Unable to challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF and A V…
  • p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese were using…
  • p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the War Department…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
  • p. 610 …Fleet Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained for sea search and…
  • p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
  • p. 615 …it had been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only leads to…
  • p. 619 …On the tactical side, valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew which flew two…
  • p. 626 …bomber crews flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy airfields." During the seven…
  • p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut was contemplated; and…
  • p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
  • p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
  • p. 634 …T o the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive had figured as…
  • p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
  • p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
  • p. 637 …I ) allocate to Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according to an…
  • p. 647 …TRIGGER, a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
  • p. 648 …important fea- tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp cleavage…
  • p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking…
  • p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with- out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
  • p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be made for two chains of command-that of the…
  • p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ; and while it provided…
  • p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air Force…
  • p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF. Daylight or Dark? As an argument in favor…
  • p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5 It is significant that this…
  • p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close support for ground operations in…
  • p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF bomber offensive and criticized…
  • p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined attack on Germany, the RAF…
  • p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for strategic bombardment, an attitude…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Middle East. Water shipment of the fifty P-40E Kittyhawks con-
signed to the American Volunteer Group began in February. Arrange-
ments were made for use of the British assembly plant a t Takoradi,
where the planes were prepared for the overland movement. Losses
were suffered en route, but by June most of the original fifty
had crossed into China.lo7A larger movement of sixty-eight P-4oE’s
for India and China began as the AVG deliveries were being com-
pleted. Comprising one element of a general reinforcement of the
Tenth Air Force, the P-40’s were flown to Quonset Point, Rhode
Island, in late April and there aircraft and crews were loaded on the
carrier Ranger. As the Ranger approached the west coast of Africa,
the fighters were launched at distances of 1 2 5 to 2 5 miles from the
landing field a t Accra. Although only a few of the pilots had pre-
viously flown from the deck of a carrier, all took off safely and landed
without mishap. But they were less fortunate in crossing central
Africa. T w o of the eight-plane convoys into which the P-40’S were
organized became lost over the African desert because of navigational
errors. As a result, nine of the fighters cracked up. Other difficulties
were encountered and numerous delays experienced; perhaps no more
than fifty-eight of the planes eventually reached India.’ Karachi had
become, generally speaking, the terminal point for Ferrying Com-
mand operations to the East, and until December 1942 the responsi-
bility for development of the trans-India service into China fell to
the 1st Ferrying Group and thus came under the jurisdiction of the
Tenth Air Force.*
Twin-engine transport planes were the only aircraft to be ferried
to British forces in Africa during the first six months of 1942. In June,
when Rommel’s offensive reached its most threatening stage, the first
tactical aircraft began to arrive. They were not in sufficient number
to be of much help in stopping Rommel at El Alamein, but during
the late summer and fall an increasing flow of twin-engine bombers
departed from Florida to become a part of the great movement of
supplies into Africa in preparation for Montgomery’s offensive in
October. Between June and the end of the year, 398 Lockheed and
Martin medium bombers-including I 2 0 B-34’s, I 53 A-28’~,45 B-26’s,
and 80 A-3o’s-were ferried to British forces in Africa by crews of Pan
American Air Ferries or by American and British military crews.loQ
At the same time, the forces gathering under the leadership of General
* See below, Chap. 14.
340

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