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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G shift to the Pacific route of heavy bomber ferrying to the Southwest Pacific area, the Ferrying Command control office a t A4acDill Field was discontinued. Meanwhile, in January the command had been as- signed jurisdiction over Morrison Field near West Palm Beach, Florida, for future use as the aerial port of embarkation for ferried aircraft departing over the southeastern route, A subheadquarters of the command, known as the South Atlantic Sector, was established a t the field and an experienced Ferrying Command officer, Col. Paul E. Burrows, was appointed commanding officer of both the sector and the air base. In order to concentrate a11 ferrying activities at the one base, the 3 I 3th Materiel Squadron and certain key officers were trans- ferred from Miami, where a small control office had existed since November 1941. Thereafter, A4iami served principally as the base for air cargo operations of the contract carriers. At Morrison Field the 3 I 3th Squadron performed 1st and zd echelon maintenance, while heavy maintenance work of 3d and 4th echelon became the respon- sibility of the subdepot established at the field by the Air Service Com- mand in late February. Aircraft maintenance was the most important aspect of the staging job a t this time, for the success of a flight de- pended largely on the mechanical condition of the airplane on take-off. And it would be some time before maintenance facilities at bases along the foreign routes compared favorably with those at ports of embarkation within the United States.97 When lend-lease shipments were temporarily suspended immedi- ately following Pearl Harbor, doubt existed in the minds of some as to whether the United States, concerned primarily with its own re- quirements, would continue to give logistical support to those nations that had now become allies. Would the needs of American armed forces preclude the further shipment of aircraft and other supplies to Britain, Russia, China, and the smaller nations at war with the Axis? An answer to this question was given by the President on 1 2 De- cember in a report to Congress on lend-lease, in which he laid down the principle that “we must use the weapons from the arsenal of the democracies where they can be employed most effectively.” 98 This decision, to distribute arms in accordance with strategic needs, had formed the basis for the diversion of heavy bombers originally con- signed to the British in the Middle East to American forces in the Southwest Pacific; it also assured continued support in the form of twin-engine bombers, fighters, and transport aircraft to British im- 3 3 7
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