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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“The Invaders”15 pages
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G a t best only fifteen to twenty hours of four-engine flying time before leaving Tampa. In addition to, and partly because of, the inexperience of crews, special problems of morale and discipline de~eloped.’~Con- trol officers stationed along the route, often themselves new and inex- perienced in their tasks, a t times felt the lack of that kind of authority which belongs only to a recognized and well-established position. Equally serious were shortages of gas and oil, primitive refueling and maintenance facilities, and an inadequate weather and communications network. The single problem of providing a sufficient supply of gas and oil a t refueling points was staggering in itself. An estimated 500,- ooo to I ,ooo,ooo gallons of I oo-octane gasoline with proportionate amounts of lubricating oil were required a t each of a dozen control points. Nearly all of this had to come by tanker from the United States. Although a roo-octane refinery existed at Abadan in the Middle East, an estimated 90 per cent of its production was required by the RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had to be shipped and stored in bulk and this required that the shipment of materials for tank construction precede that of the gasoline itself.gs The speed with which the Project X movement was undertaken made it impossible for the Ferrying Command to build up in time a supply of spare parts a t intermediate bases, and this one factor was probably more responsible than any other for the numerous delays en route. Except for the few spares carried by each airplane and some Liberator parts stocked by the RAF a t Cairo, all spare parts had to be shipped from the United States. Cannibalization enabled some of the grounded planes to continue on their way, but those that had been robbed and those suffering major damage had to wait for the parts to be moved out by air, when possible, or by water. T h e small amount of air cargo space available at the time, the priority given to high-ranking military personnel traveling by air, and the almost total lack of trans- port planes capable of carrying complete engine assemblies made the movement of supplies by air more than difficult. Some spares were shipped to West Africa by water and then distributed to points in Africa and India by Pan American planes. T h e shortage of mainte- nance crews at most points forced the combat crews to do their own maintenance work after long and fatiguing flights. Some help was given by a Ferrying Command trouble-shooting crew sent along the route in February to make such special or major repairs as were be- 3 3 5
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