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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I f
In order to carry out its own assigned responsibilities in connection
with the training, the Ferrying Command established a control office
at MacDill Field in January in charge of Capt. James C. Jensen, a
veteran four-engine pilot, H e was assisted by specialists in the various
crew positions, that is, pilots, co-pilots, navigators, radio operators,
and flight engineers, all of whom had had trans-Atlantic flying experi-
ence with the B-24 shuttle services to Great Britain and Cairo. The
first step was to establish a ferrying school for the Project X crews,
with the Ferrying Command specialists and certain others serving as
instructors. Instruction was given in navigation, radio, aircraft main-
tenance, gunnery, and four-engine transition, the latter including, be-
cause of the inexperience of the crews, some instruction in night
landings and take-offs. Another important aspect of the training pro-
gram was the briefing of the crews on weather, communications, land-
ing fields, housing, messing, and health conditions along the route. The
briefing of crews for overseas flight would develop into one of the
more fundamental and specialized functions of ATC, but the pro-
cedures at this initial stage were rudimentary indeed by comparison
with the system that was later set up at aerial ports of embarkation
and a t overseas stations around the world. In addition to the informa-
tion that could be provided out of the personal experience of a few
officers, the bomber crews were supplied with maps, charts, and other
material on route conditions procured from a variety of sources by the
Ferrying Command’s intelligence section. According to officers con-
nected with the project, some 1 7 0 maps and charts and approximately
50 books and folders, comprising a mass of undigested, unwieldy in-
formation which served to confuse rather than inform, were furnished
each crew. Later, as the briefing technique improved, route informa-
tion was boiled down to the essentials and compressed into well-or-
ganized route guide^.^'
Training and briefing the crews and putting the aircraft in shape
for the overseas journey were only the first steps in the complex task
of moving Project X to the Far East. The most difficult part of the
job began after the bombers were on their way. It would have been
less difficult had more time been allowed for training prior to de-
parture, but some compromise had to be made between the urgent
need for the planes in the Pacific and the unpreparedness of the crews.
The majority of the pilots had been trained on single-engine or twin-
engine aircraft and because of the inadequate number of planes had
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