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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A I R S E R V I C E I N W O R L D W A R I
when war was declared, 55 trainers, of which General Pershing later
said, ‘ ‘ 5 I were obsolete and the other 4 obsolescent.” lo
N o r was there in existence an aircraft industry which could remedy
the deficiency. About a dozen companies were considered capable of
filling government contracts, but their output was pitifully meager; in
1916nine factories had contributed to the delivery of 64 planes out
of 366 ordered.“ Because of exaggerated ideas of security and the
rapid changes in combat models, the Allies had not turned to Ameri-
can industry for aircraft as they had for other munitions. Few Ameri-
cans had seen a modern tactical plane; fewer still knew what went
into its construction other than airframe and engine.
T h e organization of military aeronautics in the United States was
wholly inadequate for fighting a large-scale war. T h e Army’s air
establishment consisted of I 3 I officers, practically all pilots and student
pilots ( I I were reservists on active duty), and 1,087 enlisted men.12
T h e first Army aviation office had been set up as the Aeronautical
Division of the Signal Corps on I August 1907; and since 1914 comrol
had been vested in the Aviation Section of that corps. T h e Chief Signal
Officer, no aviator, was swamped by the rapid increase of responsi-
bilities more properly in his ken, and, as a critic later said, “a colossal
air arm cannot be organized as a section of a section of another arm.”13
With so small an officer corps the Aviation Section was unable to fur-
nish direction for the expansion program or commanders for the com-
bat units. It turned naturally to civilian sources for leadership, and,
while many of the industrial and professional men who were recruited
were able enough, few had knowledge of aviation requirements or of
military procedure. A ready source of technical advice existed in the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) , and early
in the war a number of joint Army-Navy aeronautical committees
were formed. Most important of these was the Aircraft Production
Board, a subsidiary of the Council of National Defense. By a law of
I October 19 I 7 the former was given legal status as the Aircraft Board,
headed by a civilian and containing two other civilians and six officers,
three each from the Army and Navy. Modeled apparently after the
Cowdray Air Board in England, this committee was “to supervise and
direct” the purchase and production of all aircraft, engines, and
related materials, “as authorized by the Secretary of W a r and the
Secretary of the Navy.” l 4 T h e Aircraft Board lacked the authority of
its English prototype. Organization and training of air units was a
7

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