The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A I R S E R V I C E I N W O R L D W A R I
when war was declared, 55 trainers, of which General Pershing later
said, ‘ ‘ 5 I were obsolete and the other 4 obsolescent.” lo
N o r was there in existence an aircraft industry which could remedy
the deficiency. About a dozen companies were considered capable of
filling government contracts, but their output was pitifully meager; in
1916nine factories had contributed to the delivery of 64 planes out
of 366 ordered.“ Because of exaggerated ideas of security and the
rapid changes in combat models, the Allies had not turned to Ameri-
can industry for aircraft as they had for other munitions. Few Ameri-
cans had seen a modern tactical plane; fewer still knew what went
into its construction other than airframe and engine.
T h e organization of military aeronautics in the United States was
wholly inadequate for fighting a large-scale war. T h e Army’s air
establishment consisted of I 3 I officers, practically all pilots and student
pilots ( I I were reservists on active duty), and 1,087 enlisted men.12
T h e first Army aviation office had been set up as the Aeronautical
Division of the Signal Corps on I August 1907; and since 1914 comrol
had been vested in the Aviation Section of that corps. T h e Chief Signal
Officer, no aviator, was swamped by the rapid increase of responsi-
bilities more properly in his ken, and, as a critic later said, “a colossal
air arm cannot be organized as a section of a section of another arm.”13
With so small an officer corps the Aviation Section was unable to fur-
nish direction for the expansion program or commanders for the com-
bat units. It turned naturally to civilian sources for leadership, and,
while many of the industrial and professional men who were recruited
were able enough, few had knowledge of aviation requirements or of
military procedure. A ready source of technical advice existed in the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) , and early
in the war a number of joint Army-Navy aeronautical committees
were formed. Most important of these was the Aircraft Production
Board, a subsidiary of the Council of National Defense. By a law of
I October 19 I 7 the former was given legal status as the Aircraft Board,
headed by a civilian and containing two other civilians and six officers,
three each from the Army and Navy. Modeled apparently after the
Cowdray Air Board in England, this committee was “to supervise and
direct” the purchase and production of all aircraft, engines, and
related materials, “as authorized by the Secretary of W a r and the
Secretary of the Navy.” l 4 T h e Aircraft Board lacked the authority of
its English prototype. Organization and training of air units was a
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