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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G
trol of the commanding general of the US.Army Forces in the Far
East. Karachi was the gateway to India through which all transient
aircraft going farther than the Middle East had to pass. Here the
Ferrying Command placed a control officer early in January 1942
just as the first of the heavy bombers were moving through on the
way to the Far East.s7 The flight commanders of the second group
of bombers, the B - I ~ ’ s ,were ordered to proceed as far as Bangalore
in southern India, a t which point they were to report by secret means
to General MacArthur and await further orders. When it became
apparent by early January that the delivery of the heavy bombers as
far as the Philippines was a hopeless undertaking, amended orders
were issued naming Australia, rather than the Philippines, as the desti-
nation.” All flights were then directed to report upon arrival a t
Bangalore to General Brett at Darwin, Australia, and await orders.
Lt. Col. Edward H. Alexander, then in China, was sent to Bangalore
to act as Ferrying Command control officer.”
Although the staging of the heavy bombers and crews at MacDill
Field came under the control of the Third Air Force, the Ferrying
Command was given certain responsibilities in connection with the
final processing at Tampa. In late December the command sent Lt.
Louis T. Reichers and another officer to MacDill Field to assist in
loading the bombers for overseas flight in accordance with established
weight and balance specifications. Upon arriving at the field, Reichers
found that the LB-3o’s then being processed were overloaded with all
sorts of miscellaneous and excess equipment. H e removed an average
of over 3,000 pounds from each plane and made arrangements to ship
such of this equipment as would be needed in the combat zone by the
Pan American transport service. All planes were brought down below
the absolute maximum weight allowed for safe flying. The planes were
to be flown by their own combat crews, and Reichers naturally found
many of the young officers and men making up the crews inexperi-
enced, untrained in long-distance flight procedures, and jittery. As
with most human beings facing the unknown, some were obviously
in fear of the long flight over ocean, jungle, and desert. It was clear
that additional training prior to take-off would be needed if a high
accident rate was to I be avoided, but the pressure for speed in the
movement of urgently needed reinforcements was such that permis-
sion to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash-
ington.’O
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