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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G
trol of the commanding general of the US.Army Forces in the Far
East. Karachi was the gateway to India through which all transient
aircraft going farther than the Middle East had to pass. Here the
Ferrying Command placed a control officer early in January 1942
just as the first of the heavy bombers were moving through on the
way to the Far East.s7 The flight commanders of the second group
of bombers, the B - I ~ ’ s ,were ordered to proceed as far as Bangalore
in southern India, a t which point they were to report by secret means
to General MacArthur and await further orders. When it became
apparent by early January that the delivery of the heavy bombers as
far as the Philippines was a hopeless undertaking, amended orders
were issued naming Australia, rather than the Philippines, as the desti-
nation.” All flights were then directed to report upon arrival a t
Bangalore to General Brett at Darwin, Australia, and await orders.
Lt. Col. Edward H. Alexander, then in China, was sent to Bangalore
to act as Ferrying Command control officer.”
Although the staging of the heavy bombers and crews at MacDill
Field came under the control of the Third Air Force, the Ferrying
Command was given certain responsibilities in connection with the
final processing at Tampa. In late December the command sent Lt.
Louis T. Reichers and another officer to MacDill Field to assist in
loading the bombers for overseas flight in accordance with established
weight and balance specifications. Upon arriving at the field, Reichers
found that the LB-3o’s then being processed were overloaded with all
sorts of miscellaneous and excess equipment. H e removed an average
of over 3,000 pounds from each plane and made arrangements to ship
such of this equipment as would be needed in the combat zone by the
Pan American transport service. All planes were brought down below
the absolute maximum weight allowed for safe flying. The planes were
to be flown by their own combat crews, and Reichers naturally found
many of the young officers and men making up the crews inexperi-
enced, untrained in long-distance flight procedures, and jittery. As
with most human beings facing the unknown, some were obviously
in fear of the long flight over ocean, jungle, and desert. It was clear
that additional training prior to take-off would be needed if a high
accident rate was to I be avoided, but the pressure for speed in the
movement of urgently needed reinforcements was such that permis-
sion to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash-
ington.’O
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