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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G trol of the commanding general of the US.Army Forces in the Far East. Karachi was the gateway to India through which all transient aircraft going farther than the Middle East had to pass. Here the Ferrying Command placed a control officer early in January 1942 just as the first of the heavy bombers were moving through on the way to the Far East.s7 The flight commanders of the second group of bombers, the B - I ~ ’ s ,were ordered to proceed as far as Bangalore in southern India, a t which point they were to report by secret means to General MacArthur and await further orders. When it became apparent by early January that the delivery of the heavy bombers as far as the Philippines was a hopeless undertaking, amended orders were issued naming Australia, rather than the Philippines, as the desti- nation.” All flights were then directed to report upon arrival a t Bangalore to General Brett at Darwin, Australia, and await orders. Lt. Col. Edward H. Alexander, then in China, was sent to Bangalore to act as Ferrying Command control officer.” Although the staging of the heavy bombers and crews at MacDill Field came under the control of the Third Air Force, the Ferrying Command was given certain responsibilities in connection with the final processing at Tampa. In late December the command sent Lt. Louis T. Reichers and another officer to MacDill Field to assist in loading the bombers for overseas flight in accordance with established weight and balance specifications. Upon arriving at the field, Reichers found that the LB-3o’s then being processed were overloaded with all sorts of miscellaneous and excess equipment. H e removed an average of over 3,000 pounds from each plane and made arrangements to ship such of this equipment as would be needed in the combat zone by the Pan American transport service. All planes were brought down below the absolute maximum weight allowed for safe flying. The planes were to be flown by their own combat crews, and Reichers naturally found many of the young officers and men making up the crews inexperi- enced, untrained in long-distance flight procedures, and jittery. As with most human beings facing the unknown, some were obviously in fear of the long flight over ocean, jungle, and desert. It was clear that additional training prior to take-off would be needed if a high accident rate was to I be avoided, but the pressure for speed in the movement of urgently needed reinforcements was such that permis- sion to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3 3 3
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