“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G
Australia. Another Indian Ocean route was proposed that would have
connected Mombasa with Ceylon or Bangalore, India, by way of
Coetivy Island, the Chagos Archipelago, and the Maldive Island~.~'
A survey of the route across Africa was made by a board headed
by Lt. Col. Neil B. Harding." Early in March, Maj. Harold B. Willis
of the Air Corps and Lt. Col. Herman B. Pohl of the Corps of En-
gineers began a joint survey of the Indian Ocean route, making use
of a Pan American Clipper for the purpose. Before the Clipper had
left the east African base at Mombasa, however, word was received
from General Brett in Australia that Japanese operations in the area
of the COCOSIslands made the route to Australia no longer practicable.
Willis and Pohl were given orders to proceed no farther than the
Chagos Islands.78There still seemed a possibility that an alternate air
supply line to India might be found, but fortunately the preferable
Middle East land route was held and continued in use throughout the
war. Nor was it found necessary, as had been considered, to divert
all waterborne fighter aircraft to Port Elizabeth in the Union of South
Africa for ferrying up the old Cape-to-Cairo airway. Although more
exposed to attack, Takoradi and Accra in the Gold Coast Colony
continued to be the assembly points for fighter and lighter types of
aircraft shipped to Africa by
Until February 1942, when the Japanese captured Singapore and
overran the East Indies, the southeastern route served as the principal
line of air communications between the United States and the South-
west Pacific area. This was, indeed, its most immediate importance.
In the first days of the war the Japanese had cut the central Pacific
route from Hawaii through Midway and Wake to New Guinea and
Australia-the route over which the Far East Air Force had received
its thirty-five heavy bombers in the fall of 1941.Considerable progress
had been made by 7 December in the construction of bases for an
alternate, more southerly route from Hawaii to Australia through
Canton Island, the Fijis, and New Caledonia.80But this route was not
ready when orders were issued shortly after Pearl Harbor to rush
eighty heavy bombers and crews as soon as they became available to
the Far East for the relief of the Philippines." The only other route
that could possibly be used was that by way of the South Atlantic
and across Africa and southern Asia." Even though it had the marked
disadvantage of stretching approximately two-thirds of the distance
See above, pp. 179-81, 192-93, 223.
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