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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G
Australia. Another Indian Ocean route was proposed that would have
connected Mombasa with Ceylon or Bangalore, India, by way of
Coetivy Island, the Chagos Archipelago, and the Maldive Island~.~'
A survey of the route across Africa was made by a board headed
by Lt. Col. Neil B. Harding." Early in March, Maj. Harold B. Willis
of the Air Corps and Lt. Col. Herman B. Pohl of the Corps of En-
gineers began a joint survey of the Indian Ocean route, making use
of a Pan American Clipper for the purpose. Before the Clipper had
left the east African base at Mombasa, however, word was received
from General Brett in Australia that Japanese operations in the area
of the COCOSIslands made the route to Australia no longer practicable.
Willis and Pohl were given orders to proceed no farther than the
Chagos Islands.78There still seemed a possibility that an alternate air
supply line to India might be found, but fortunately the preferable
Middle East land route was held and continued in use throughout the
war. Nor was it found necessary, as had been considered, to divert
all waterborne fighter aircraft to Port Elizabeth in the Union of South
Africa for ferrying up the old Cape-to-Cairo airway. Although more
exposed to attack, Takoradi and Accra in the Gold Coast Colony
continued to be the assembly points for fighter and lighter types of
aircraft shipped to Africa by
Until February 1942, when the Japanese captured Singapore and
overran the East Indies, the southeastern route served as the principal
line of air communications between the United States and the South-
west Pacific area. This was, indeed, its most immediate importance.
In the first days of the war the Japanese had cut the central Pacific
route from Hawaii through Midway and Wake to New Guinea and
Australia-the route over which the Far East Air Force had received
its thirty-five heavy bombers in the fall of 1941.Considerable progress
had been made by 7 December in the construction of bases for an
alternate, more southerly route from Hawaii to Australia through
Canton Island, the Fijis, and New Caledonia.80But this route was not
ready when orders were issued shortly after Pearl Harbor to rush
eighty heavy bombers and crews as soon as they became available to
the Far East for the relief of the Philippines." The only other route
that could possibly be used was that by way of the South Atlantic
and across Africa and southern Asia." Even though it had the marked
disadvantage of stretching approximately two-thirds of the distance
See above, pp. 179-81, 192-93, 223.
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.