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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
for dispatching all United States military aircraft, transmitting arrival
and departure reports, providing for fueling and maintenance facili-
ties, making arrangements for feeding and lodging transient crews
and passengers, collecting and forwarding intelligence on route con-
ditions, and exercising general administrative control over transient
aircraft and crews. Considerable difficulty was experienced at first in
securing competent officers to send out. Regular Army and experi-
enced Reserve officers were more urgently needed in combat units
or in the AAF training program. For a time, the Ferrying Command
was forced to use young weather or communications officers, only
recently commissioned, as control officers a t such important bases as
Trinidad, Belem, Natal, Accra, and Karachi. These were gradually
replaced by more experienced officers with higher rank who were
better able to handle the multitude of problems that came with the
great increase in traffic and to control rapidly expanding base organ-
izations.
While that segment of the southeastern route from Florida through
Brazil was reasonably secure from attack, operations across Africa
during most of 1942 were forced to proceed in the face of an ever-
present threat of enemy interference. Most of the bases along the west
coast of Africa and across central Africa were within easy bombing
range of Vichy French territory. More threatening were Rommel’s
forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air connection
with southern Russia, India, and China depended on the holding of
the Middle East crossroads. Should the Germans and Italians have
driven the British from Egypt and the Near East, the high strategic
value of the southeastern route as it then existed would have been
immediately destroyed and the whole line, hinging on Natal, would
have been forcibly swung back far to the With this possibility
in mind, the W a r Department early in 1942 directed the survey of an
alternate bomber route across Africa and the Indian Ocean to Austra-
lia along a line roughly parallel to, and a few degrees south of, the
equator. The most feasible route was determined to be from Natal
to Ascension Island to Pointe Noire in French Equatorial Africa, and
thence by way of bases in the Belgian Congo and Tanganyika to
Mombasa in Kenya Colony, the point of take-off from the east coast
of Africa. Flight across the Indian Ocean was to be made by way of
island steppingstones in the Seychelles group or on Coetivy Island,
the Chagos Archipelago, and the COCOSIslands to Port Hedland,
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.