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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ing. This directive authorized the command to make deliveries only
to “any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to
any territory within the Western Hemisphere, the Netherlands East
Indies and Australia.” 6 8 Authority to extend the ferrying service was
obtained on 29 October. In a letter to the Secretary of War on that
date, the President authorized the delivery of aircraft “to any point
within the African continent.” 69 O n 24 November the President
issued a “blank check” directive authorizing extension of deliveries
to such other places and in such manner as may be necessary to carry
out the Lend-Lease program,” an enlargement of authority which
could be made greater by nothing short of war.?’
More than a month of preparation had been required before the
Liberators were ready to start moving, one at a time, from the United
States. With Lt. Elbert D. Reynolds, an experienced trans-Atlantic
flyer, acting as pilot, the first of the bombers departed Bolling Field
for Cairo on 20 November. Unfortunately, on the trip across Africa
the navigator lost his way and, after failing to locate El Fasher, Rey-
nolds was forced to make a night landing at El Obeid. The heavy
bomber landed on a shoulder of the runway and was wrecked beyond
repair, although the crew was saved.“ Four other aircraft of the six-
teen-Liberator project departed the United States prior to 7 Decem-
ber, and all four were delivered safely in Cairo.72But on America’s
entry into war, the remainder were turned back a t Miami or inter-
mediate domestic stations to become part of a yet-more-urgent
movement of heavy bombers to the Far East for the relief of the
Philippines.
Measures taken by the United States in the immediate prewar
period for development of the South Atlantic route proved to be
more important as preparation for the impending war than for the
ferrying and transport work actually accomplished. Only a handful
of planes, ferried and transport, moved over the route prior to Pearl
Harbor. But thanks to the work of the Air Corps Ferrying Command
and the Pan American organization, and to the courage and resource-
fulness of the pioneer crews who flew the route, the United States
had made a substantial start toward the development of a vital line
of communications when, after 7 December, aircraft and supplies for
its own forces joined the increasing flow of lend-lease goods to the
Middle East, to India, China, and the Southwest Pacific.
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3 2 8

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