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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ing. This directive authorized the command to make deliveries only
to “any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to
any territory within the Western Hemisphere, the Netherlands East
Indies and Australia.” 6 8 Authority to extend the ferrying service was
obtained on 29 October. In a letter to the Secretary of War on that
date, the President authorized the delivery of aircraft “to any point
within the African continent.” 69 O n 24 November the President
issued a “blank check” directive authorizing extension of deliveries
to such other places and in such manner as may be necessary to carry
out the Lend-Lease program,” an enlargement of authority which
could be made greater by nothing short of war.?’
More than a month of preparation had been required before the
Liberators were ready to start moving, one at a time, from the United
States. With Lt. Elbert D. Reynolds, an experienced trans-Atlantic
flyer, acting as pilot, the first of the bombers departed Bolling Field
for Cairo on 20 November. Unfortunately, on the trip across Africa
the navigator lost his way and, after failing to locate El Fasher, Rey-
nolds was forced to make a night landing at El Obeid. The heavy
bomber landed on a shoulder of the runway and was wrecked beyond
repair, although the crew was saved.“ Four other aircraft of the six-
teen-Liberator project departed the United States prior to 7 Decem-
ber, and all four were delivered safely in Cairo.72But on America’s
entry into war, the remainder were turned back a t Miami or inter-
mediate domestic stations to become part of a yet-more-urgent
movement of heavy bombers to the Far East for the relief of the
Philippines.
Measures taken by the United States in the immediate prewar
period for development of the South Atlantic route proved to be
more important as preparation for the impending war than for the
ferrying and transport work actually accomplished. Only a handful
of planes, ferried and transport, moved over the route prior to Pearl
Harbor. But thanks to the work of the Air Corps Ferrying Command
and the Pan American organization, and to the courage and resource-
fulness of the pioneer crews who flew the route, the United States
had made a substantial start toward the development of a vital line
of communications when, after 7 December, aircraft and supplies for
its own forces joined the increasing flow of lend-lease goods to the
Middle East, to India, China, and the Southwest Pacific.
(6
3 2 8

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.