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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G
Washington for Cairo prior to 7 December, each carrying important
military or diplomatic personnel as well as high-priority cargo and
mail.63 The service continued on a special-mission basis during the
critical early months of war, pending the establishment of a greatly
expanded and more regularly scheduled contract carrier operation
over the route.
In the course of his mission to the Middle East in September, Gen-
eral Brett reached the conclusion that the long-range B-24 bomber
would provide an effective and quick means of attacking the Germans
in southern Europe and of taking definite offensive action against the
Axis forces in North Africa.64Having proceeded from Cairo to Lon-
don,’* he found the British receptive to a suggestion that twenty
B-24’s be diverted from a scheduled delivery for service in the United
Kingdom to the Middle East. It was decided that the number of
planes should be reduced to sixteen (the initial equipment of one
squadron), that provision would have to be made for training the
British crews in the Middle East, and that a stock of spare parts and
supplies should be sent out from the United States. Tentative agree-
ments reached in London were conveyed on 17 October to General
Arnold, who gave his approval.”
The task of making the preliminary arrangements and delivering
the sixteen Liberators devolved upon the Ferrying Command.“ Here-
tofore, Ferrying Command deliveries had been to “the point of ulti-
mate take-off” within the Western Hemisphere. These were to be
the first deliveries beyond the continent by military crews of the
Ferrying Command and the first combat aircraft to be sent over the
southeastern route to Africa. There was no alternative to the use of
military crews. Pan American Air Ferries’ pilots were trained for the
ferrying of two-engine aircraft, not four-engine. Military crews be-
came available by the coincidence that on 18 October the Ferrying
Command’s B-24 shuttle service over the North Atlantic to Great
Britain was suspended, temporarily it was believed at the time, pend-
ing winterization of the aircraft and the improvement of weather and
communications facilities.6T
Before ferrying by military crews to Africa could begin, it became
necessary to secure an amendment to the presidential directive of 3
October 1941, under which the Ferrying Command was then operat-
* For a discussion of his activities there, see below, pp. 634-35.
327

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