The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the British and French war missions to Washington, before any deci-
sion had been made as to what the American war contribution should
be. Few in the United States as yet envisaged an expeditionary force
of millions of men, and it is possible that the French, gauging the
public attitude shrewdly, thought it easier to sell the idea of a war of
machine^.^ Certainly the deployment in France of a force of 4,500
combat planes would have entailed a more lavish use of aviation than
had yet been employed in the close support of ground armies.
The new program, which immediately supplanted earlier modest
estimates, called for an appropriation of $640,000,000.The necessary
legislation was pushed rapidly through Congress in the Aviation Act
of 24 July 1917. The bill was passed without roll call-also without
concurrence by the Army’s General Staff, having been borne on a
wave of public enthusiasm engendered by a high-powered publicity
campaign. Slogans such as the “cloud of planes” and the “million roads
to Berlin” became in anticipation concrete realities. Inspired news
stories and editorials played on the speed and economy of life with
which aviation could turn the scales against Germany; the capacity
of America to fulfil the production, training, and tactical requirements
was seldom doubted.“ As the New York Times put it editorially: “By
no other means can we so quickly or so surely render valuable aid to
our allies. . . . Airplanes can be rapidly built. . . . Money is all that is
lacking.” A few experts thought differently, though rarely for pub-
lication: that “no amount of money will buy time. Even the most
generous preparations do not open up the years that have passed and
enable us to carefully lay the foundations of a great industry and a
great aerial army.” Experience was to show the wisdom of this view.
Of all the requisites for air power, we had only raw materials, man-
power, and enthusiasm. W e had, literally speaking, no air force. Hav-
ing invented the airplane, we had left to others its development and
adaptation to military use. The Army had acquired its first plane in
1909; its first special appropriation for aviation, a sum of $125,000,in
19x1.‘ Shortly before the European war began, we had stood four-
teenth in total funds appropriated-well below Greece and Bulgaria.8
In spite of the great development of aviation by European belligerents
and of our own tactical experiences in Mexico, the Army from 1909
to April 1917 had been able to acquire only 224 aircraft.’ Not one of
these was, by European standards, a combat model; few were still in
commission. At TWO flying fields operated by the Army there were,
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