The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A I R S E R V I C E I N W O R L D W A R I
the attitudes and convictions of the Army’s airmen on the eve of their
second war.
From Aviation Section to Air Service
The story of the Army air arm in World War I was one of promise
rather than of achievement. The combat record was excellent, but brief
and on a scale far more modest than the public had been led to expect.
This explains why most of the official reports of the Air Service’s war
activities were compounded of statistics and apology, There is now
little cause to wonder at the failure to make good the brave promises
of 1917-indeed, but for their extravagance, the feebleness of the air
effort might have received far less public criticism. But, in order to
secure support for unprecedented appropriations, those in charge of
military aviation, civilians and officers alike, made rash predictions.
Probably their claims were inspired by inexperience rather than by
an outright lack of candor, but they were wholly unwarranted; and,
when the failure of the program became a matter of common h o w l -
edge, reaction was bitter. Reorganization was swift and effective, and,
had the war dragged on into 1919,the boasts might have been made
good, if somewhat tardily.
On 1 3 June 1917 a spokesman for the newly created Aircraft Pro-
duction Board said for publication: “We believe we have worked
out a program which will make it possible for the United States to
secure to the Allies next year the permanent supremacy of the air, and
with that we hope to become an immediate, decisive factor in ending
the war.” The program to which he referred was, by existing stand-
ards, huge. It had been suggested to the United States government by
French Premier Ribot in a cable received 26 May. Ribot had asked
that the Americans place a t the French front by 3 0 June 1918a “flying
corps” of 4,500 planes, 5,000 pilots, and 50,000 mechanics. As elabo-
rated by officers of the Aviation Section, this program provided for a
total of 22,625 aircraft, including 1 2 , 0 0 0 of the latest service models,
and a training establishment equipped to graduate from primary
schools 6,2 10pilots.z Ribot had requested for the next spring campaign
an air force larger by far than that which the French had been able to
build in three years of war and wholly out of proportion, according to
existing ratios of air to ground forces, to infantry troops then contem-
plated for the AEF. Perhaps the formidable demand was more than
a tribute to American industrial capacity. It came close on the heels of
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