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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ferrying organization for the flight to Scotland. By ferrying these
bombers under their own power, vital shipping space was saved and
factory-to-combat delivery time was cut from approximately three
months to less than ten days."
The British ferrying service was well under way when the Lend-
Lease Act became law on I I March 1941.Improving weather condi-
tions in the spring of 1941 and increasing aircraft production made
possible a speedup in trans-Atlantic deliveries, but the Atlantic ferry-
ing organization, or ATFERO as it became known when taken over
directly by the British Ministry of Aircraft Production, experienced
considerable difficulty in recruiting a sufficient number of pilots and
other crew members to maintain schedules. The War Department at
the time was attempting, not too successfully, to assist the British in
employing additional pilots in the United state^,^ and the British them-
selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units for
ferrying duty. A solution to the problem was made possible by the
Lend-Lease Act. On 2 1 April, General Arnold wired from London,
where he was then conferring with British officials as to means of ex-
tending aid, proposing that the United States Army Air Corps take
over responsibility for the ferrying of British aircraft from the fac-
tories to Montreal. T w o major ends to be achieved were set forth in
the message. American military pilots would be able to acquire highly
useful training in flying the latest types of combat aircraft; and civilian
pilots then employed by the factories would be released for service
with ATFERO in delivering the aircraft across the Atlantic.6 Hard
pressed for pilots, the British received General Arnold's proposal with
enthusiasm and readily consented to give official sanction to American
use of British-owned aircraft for training purposes within the United
States.'
In the course of discussions between representatives of the two
countries during the month that followed, consideration was given to
a plan favored by the War Department by which the United States
would take over control of the whole ferrying operation from the
factories to Britain. But to certain features of this plan Brig. Gen. Carl
Spaatz, then on the staff of the Chief of the Air Corps, raised objections
which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the
more modest proposal of General Arnold of 2 1 April and to leave
to the British the job of flying the aircraft across the Atlantic. On 28
May the President directed the Secretary of War to take full respon-
3 '4

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