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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ferrying organization for the flight to Scotland. By ferrying these
bombers under their own power, vital shipping space was saved and
factory-to-combat delivery time was cut from approximately three
months to less than ten days."
The British ferrying service was well under way when the Lend-
Lease Act became law on I I March 1941.Improving weather condi-
tions in the spring of 1941 and increasing aircraft production made
possible a speedup in trans-Atlantic deliveries, but the Atlantic ferry-
ing organization, or ATFERO as it became known when taken over
directly by the British Ministry of Aircraft Production, experienced
considerable difficulty in recruiting a sufficient number of pilots and
other crew members to maintain schedules. The War Department at
the time was attempting, not too successfully, to assist the British in
employing additional pilots in the United state^,^ and the British them-
selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units for
ferrying duty. A solution to the problem was made possible by the
Lend-Lease Act. On 2 1 April, General Arnold wired from London,
where he was then conferring with British officials as to means of ex-
tending aid, proposing that the United States Army Air Corps take
over responsibility for the ferrying of British aircraft from the fac-
tories to Montreal. T w o major ends to be achieved were set forth in
the message. American military pilots would be able to acquire highly
useful training in flying the latest types of combat aircraft; and civilian
pilots then employed by the factories would be released for service
with ATFERO in delivering the aircraft across the Atlantic.6 Hard
pressed for pilots, the British received General Arnold's proposal with
enthusiasm and readily consented to give official sanction to American
use of British-owned aircraft for training purposes within the United
States.'
In the course of discussions between representatives of the two
countries during the month that followed, consideration was given to
a plan favored by the War Department by which the United States
would take over control of the whole ferrying operation from the
factories to Britain. But to certain features of this plan Brig. Gen. Carl
Spaatz, then on the staff of the Chief of the Air Corps, raised objections
which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the
more modest proposal of General Arnold of 2 1 April and to leave
to the British the job of flying the aircraft across the Atlantic. On 28
May the President directed the Secretary of War to take full respon-
3 '4

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.