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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 47 …s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division (strategic reserve), and Italian and Portuguese…
  • p. 113 …Japanese Air Power The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms, had…
  • p. 119 …naval air service, and a colonial air force.” For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost…
  • p. 120 …In its first “combat” test during the thirties the Italian Air Force faced no real opposition…
  • p. 121 …The hope was not fulfilled, for numerous weaknesses in the Italian Air Force rapidly came to…
  • p. 122 …The fundamental weakness of the Italian Air Force was not in its theory of air power…
  • p. 197 …naval forces, and within prescribed boundaries to destroy any German and Italian naval, air, and ground…
  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 554 …Chennault, who since 1937 had been serving as special adviser to the Chinese Air Force. Known…
  • p. 705 …Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, to England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was…
  • p. 752 …USSBS, Japanese Air Power. 9. Notes on the Italian Air Force, in special file of Brig…
  • p. 805 …History, First Air Force. 44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8 May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p…
  • p. 851 …E S Italian Air Force: 82-85; development, Italian East Africa, 84 Italy, Air Ministry, 82…
  • p. 857 …See Italian Air Force. Reinforcements. See theaters. Renault works, 593 Replacement Control Depot, ~ z t h…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ferrying organization for the flight to Scotland. By ferrying these
bombers under their own power, vital shipping space was saved and
factory-to-combat delivery time was cut from approximately three
months to less than ten days."
The British ferrying service was well under way when the Lend-
Lease Act became law on I I March 1941.Improving weather condi-
tions in the spring of 1941 and increasing aircraft production made
possible a speedup in trans-Atlantic deliveries, but the Atlantic ferry-
ing organization, or ATFERO as it became known when taken over
directly by the British Ministry of Aircraft Production, experienced
considerable difficulty in recruiting a sufficient number of pilots and
other crew members to maintain schedules. The War Department at
the time was attempting, not too successfully, to assist the British in
employing additional pilots in the United state^,^ and the British them-
selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units for
ferrying duty. A solution to the problem was made possible by the
Lend-Lease Act. On 2 1 April, General Arnold wired from London,
where he was then conferring with British officials as to means of ex-
tending aid, proposing that the United States Army Air Corps take
over responsibility for the ferrying of British aircraft from the fac-
tories to Montreal. T w o major ends to be achieved were set forth in
the message. American military pilots would be able to acquire highly
useful training in flying the latest types of combat aircraft; and civilian
pilots then employed by the factories would be released for service
with ATFERO in delivering the aircraft across the Atlantic.6 Hard
pressed for pilots, the British received General Arnold's proposal with
enthusiasm and readily consented to give official sanction to American
use of British-owned aircraft for training purposes within the United
States.'
In the course of discussions between representatives of the two
countries during the month that followed, consideration was given to
a plan favored by the War Department by which the United States
would take over control of the whole ferrying operation from the
factories to Britain. But to certain features of this plan Brig. Gen. Carl
Spaatz, then on the staff of the Chief of the Air Corps, raised objections
which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the
more modest proposal of General Arnold of 2 1 April and to leave
to the British the job of flying the aircraft across the Atlantic. On 28
May the President directed the Secretary of War to take full respon-
3 '4

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.