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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
which men and supplies could be moved to the battlefronts2 While
the conference was still in session it had become clear that the Philip-
pines could not be held, principally because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such as
they were, could reach MacArthur. By the end of February 1942, the
air connection between India and Australia was also cut, although
some heavy bombers and other reinforcements from the United States
were able to get through before the Japanese captured Singapore and
overran the Netherlands East Indies. T h e Australia-Philippines and
the Australia-India air routes, included in the seven declared to be of
the highest strategic importance, were thus lost in the first shock
of the Japanese attack. Fortunately for the Allies, the five remaining
major routes were held. Each of the five had its beginning within the
continental United States and reached out from the main arsenal of
the United Nations to one or more of the major theaters of war: ( I )
the northeastern route, earliest to be developed for military purposes,
provided an air connection with Great Britain; ( 2 ) the northwest
route, with Alaska and the Russian front by way of Siberia; ( 3 ) the
South Pacific route, with Australia and the western Pacific islands;
(4) the southeastern route, with Africa, the Middle East, India, China,
and, for a brief time, the Southwest Pacific area; and ( 5 ) the mid-
Atlantic route, with Europe and North Africa by way of the Azores.
While this fifth trunk route was not opened until late 1943, the
United States and Great Britain were at all times prepared to occupy
the Azores had the security and future use of the route been threatened
by the Axis.
During the early period of American participation in the war the
southeastern route to Africa and beyond assumed an importance far
surpassing that of any of the o t h e r ~ . ~In contrast to the slowness with
which the North Atlantic route, as well as the newly developed South
Pacific and Alaskan routes, came into use during the months following
7 December, the South Atlantic airway was forced a t once to support
a heavy volume of air traffic that strained its facilities and personnel
to the limit. Lend-lease aircraft and supplies were sent over the route
to the British forces in Egypt and to the Russians through Iran, with
a smaller volume going via India into China. The earliest heavy bomber
reinforcements sent to American air forces in the Southwest Pacific
following the Japanese attack were moved over the route, as were
most of the aircraft and crews that would form the nuclei of the Ninth
3 1 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.