“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E
from mainland bases on 2 0 May. The Umnak field was still far from
complete, but American land-based planes would be on hand to greet
the Japanese in June. Not even the Seabees would tackle a more diffi-
cult job than that credited on Umnak Island to the Army’s aviation
engineers.
By I June the Eleventh Air Force, so designated on 5 February,
had been greatly increased in size and strength. Brig. Gen. William 0.
Butler had assumed command in March. From a force of just over
2,200 on 6 December 1941, it had risen to double that strength seven
months later. T o the t3d Air Base Group, the 18th Pursuit Squadron,
and the 28th Composite Group (comprised of the 73d Bombardment
Squadron [MI and the 36th Bombardment Squadron [HI), had been
added the I Ith and 54th Fighter squadrons * (the latter on 3 I May)
and the 77th Bombardment Squadron (M). The force also included
the 4zd Transport Squadron, activated in May.178Much of the equip-
ment of P-~o’s,P-39’s, P-38’s, B-17’s, and B-26’s, however, was re-
ceived from the United States only in the weeks and days immediately
preceding the Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor.+
Meantime, the new base a t Cold Bay had also been put in a state of
readine~s.’~~But the provision of additional planes and new bases in
the Alaskan area left one grave weakness in its defense, for there was
still no adequate aircraft warning service. T h e existence of extensive
uninhabited regions made it impossible to develop an Alaskan ground
observer corps, with the result that a warning riet had to depend almost
entirely upon radar. And in addition to the shortages of equipment
and trained men which prevailed elsewhere, special problems impeded
efforts to provide radar equipment for Alaska. Sites were usually inac-
cessible by road, and in most cases there were no landing fields close
enough to permit the aerial supply of radar stations. Thus it became
necessary to move equipment by small boats when the pack ice per-
mitted; and, because of these problems of transportation, a radar set
installed in Alaska-even the so-called mobile equipment-tended to
become a fixed station. The time and labor required was made the
greater by the necessity to provide quarters for the operators.18’ These
considerations made it particularly unfortunate that the directives
governing earlier site selection had been imperfect. The necessary
” AAF pursuit and interceptor units had been redesignated “fighter” on 15 May.
t See below, pp. 462-65.
307